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E-LAWYERING, THE ABA’S CURRENT CHOICE OF ETHICS LAW RULE & THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: WHY THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
INVALIDATES MODEL RULE 8.5(b)(2) WHEN APPLIED TO ATTORNEY
INTERNET REPRESENTATIONS OF CLIENTS
Michael W. Loudenslager1
“The global nature of the Internet and the jurisdictional limitations on the
practice of law following geographical boundaries raise troubling issues for
lawyers of regulatory compliance, jurisdiction and choice of law.”2
Abstract
The Internet is becoming the primary manner in which some attorneys serve clients.
States have already taken differing views on whether it is acceptable for an attorney to engage in
electronic representations of clients. Thus, determining what jurisdiction’s law applies to such
attorney conduct can be very important in deciding whether this activity constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law, and, if not, the exact duties of an attorney in such representations.
This article argues that the current version of Model Rule of Professional Responsibility
8.5(b), which governs choice of ethics law, can be interpreted to apply the legal ethics rules of the
state in which the attorney is located to all electronic representations. However, the dormant
commerce clause prohibits a state from regulating activity that does not occur or have a
significant effect in its physical boundaries. It is not clear that the state in which the lawyer is
located has a significant enough interest, under a dormant commerce clause analysis, to prohibit,
or even regulate, this type of representation in most situations. Often, the effect of an electronic
representation will be born wholly in the other state where the client is located, and this state’s
ethical regime would be ignored under the likely interpretation of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2).
Therefore, jurisdictions should either eliminate the language from the rule that results in
the application of the ethics regime of the attorney’s home jurisdiction in all situations or define
key terms in the rule to focus the analysis on the location of the client affected and the jurisdiction
where the legal advice provided is acted upon. Either option will allow for the application of the
ethics rules of the jurisdiction where the client is physically located when the most significant
effect from the representation is felt in the client’s home jurisdiction. Because this state has a
much more significant interest in protecting the resident client from potentially damaging legal
representations, this jurisdiction more properly should determine the manner in which attorneys
can represent its residents and whether any constraints should be placed on electronic
representations.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Internet3 has changed the manner in which many attorneys serve and procure
clients. For example, e-mail4 now allows attorneys to respond to clients more quickly
and with less cost.5 Attorneys also can file a document electronically now in many

3

“The Internet” is a term coined from the “interconnected network” that makes up this computer system.
Ari Lanin, Note, Who Controls The Internet? States’ Rights and the Reawakening of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423 n.1 (2000). “The Internet is a diverse set of independent
networks, interlinked to provide its users with the appearance of a single, uniform network.” Comm. on the
Internet in the Evolving Info. Infrastructure et al., The Internet’s Coming of Age 29 (2001). One
commentator defines the “Internet” as “the worldwide ‘network of networks’ that are connected to each
other, using IP [Internet Protocol] and other similar protocols.” Paul S. Jacobsen, Net Law: How Lawyers
Use the Internet 217 (1997).
4
Also known as “electronic mail,” e-mail is computer software that allows people with an Internet
connection to send “messages documents, and graphics to other people connected to the Internet.”
Jacobsen, supra note 3, at 215.
5
See John A Wetenkamp, Note, The Impact of E-mail on Attorney Practice and Ethics, 34 McGeorge L.
Rev. 135, 136 (2002) (stating that e-mail can “save clients money because it tends to streamline
communications and it costs less than a telephone call”); Brett R. Harris, Counseling Clients Over the
Internet, 18 Computer & Internet Law. 4, 4 (2001) (noting that e-mail “can be transmitted quickly and
without undue expense” and that e-mail “at times [is] more practical and economical than telephone or
facsimile transmissions”). Additionally, the use of e-mail attachments can speed up client review of
document drafts and consequently increase the speed at which attorneys can draft and have documents
filed. See Harris, supra, at 4 (stating that e-mail attachments can “be revised by the recipients
electronically and then returned to the sender, in effect creating a collaborative effort to get documents into
final form”).
Attorney use of e-mail to communicate with clients originally was controversial. See Jason
Krause, Guarding the Cyberfort, ABA J., July 2003, at 42-43 (discussing the “debate in the legal
community” from 1995 to 1999 “about whether it was safe to practice law over the Internet” and stating
that some firms even issued bans on attorney use of e-mail). In 1999, the American Bar Association
(“ABA”) issued an ethics opinion stating that a lawyer could transmit client information by e-mail under
most circumstances without violating professional ethics rules. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) (finding that an attorney can “transmit information relating to
the representation of a client by unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet” without violating professionial
ethics rules “because the mode of transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a
technological and legal standpoint”). Many attorneys now routinely communicate with clients through email. See ABA Legal Technology Resource Center, June 2000 Telephone Survey: How Attorneys Use EMail, at http://www.lawtechnology.org/surveys/june2000.html (indicating that, according to a June 2000
telephone survey, 94 percent of attorneys used e-mail in their practices and 71 percent used e-mail to
communicate with clients).
Despite the current widespread use of e-mail by attorneys to communicate with clients, some
commentators still point out the confidentiality risks posed by communicating with clients in this manner
due to the risk of unauthorized interception of e-mail. Robert M. Battress & Joseph D. Harbaugh, Taking
the Lawyer’s Craft into Virtual Space: Computer-Mediated Interviewing, Counseling & Negotiating, 10
Clinical L. Rev. 115, 151 (2003) (“Concerns continue to exist regarding the ability of hackers and persons
with ulterior motives to intercept emails and also the capacity of service providers to intrude on
communications.”); R. Scot Hopkins & Pamela R. Reynolds, Redefining Privacy and Security in the
Electronic Communication Age: A Lawyer’s Ethical Duty in the Virtual World of the Internet, 16 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 675, 676 (2003) (“[T]the ease with which email communications may be intercepted make it a
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courts.6 Additionally, the World Wide Web (the “Web”)7 allows attorneys to market
themselves on a more widespread basis through law firm Web sites.8 The marketing of
legal services on the Web has become so pervasive that several freestanding Web sites
now exist with the purpose of matching potential clients with attorneys.9 Often, allowing
people to make their initial inquiry to an attorney through an e-mail or a client intake
form provided on a Web site eases an attorney’s screening of potential clients.10
In a more dramatic development, the Internet is becoming the primary, or in some
cases sole, manner in which particular attorneys serve clients. For example, some of the
Web sites designed to match clients with attorneys also allow attorneys to provide legal

particulary ripe target for even unsophisticated email thieves, and that this attribute is unique to Internet
email.”).
6
Maria Perez Crist, The E-Brief: Legal Writing for an Online World, 33 N.M. L. Rev. 49, 54 (2003)
(describing the federal courts’ Case Management/Electronic Case Files program that “allows attorneys to
log in to court web sites with a court-issued password and submit documents to the court electronically”).
7
The Web is a “hypertext–based system for finding and accessing Internet resources.” Jacobsen, supra
note 3, at 223. The Web uses “Hypertext Markup Language,” or HTML, to tell a computer exactly how to
display a document so that a page on a computer screen appears exactly how it appears in its printed
version. Michael W. Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Information Superhighway: State
Interests and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. Publ.
Law 191, 262 (2003).
8
Beyond just providing general information about the firm and its attorneys, law firm Web sites often
provide information or articles on particular legal issues or topics concerning the firm’s practice areas that
would be of interest to potential clients or the general public. See Make the Most of the Web to Expand
Your Practice 1 (LexisNexis/Martindale Hubbell 2004) (providing a checklist for law firm Web sites that
includes “recent articles written” as a way to “showcase your firm’s credentials”); William Hornsby,
Improving the Delivery of Affordable Legal Services Through the Internet: A Blueprint for the Shift to a
Digital Paradigm 6 (Nov. 1999) in The Changing Face of Legal Practice: A National Conference on
“Unbundled” Legal Services, Conference Materials (2000), at
http://www.unbundledlaw.org/program/program.htm (stating that law firm Web sites typically include
“material that demonstrate the firm’s capacity, such as articles”). As of September 2004, Hornsby was staff
attorney to the ABA Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services. Mark Hansen, Helping SelfHelpers, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2004, at 72.
9
See, e.g., www.lawyers.com, www.legalmatch.com, www.attorneypages.com. “Many online directories
are contained within web sites as parts of other information and services. In other words, the directories
that help consumers find lawyers are a subsidiary part of a site with general consumer information about
legal issues or the subject matter of interest to the consumer.” Hornsby, supra note 8, at 7.
10
See Terry Carter, Casting for Clients, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2004, at 35, 37 (discussing an attorney who screens
potential clients through e-mail “which has added the value of being more efficient than fielding phone
calls” and a Web site, www.legalmatch.com, that allows potential clients to “fill out forms online detailing
their circumstances and problems” for lawyer review); Hornsby, supra note 8, at 12 (stating that “law firms
are using web sites for automated intake and screening in several different practice settings”).

Copyright © 2006 by Michael W. Loudenslager

5
advice to clients directly through the site.11 On Internet “bulletin boards” or
“newsgroups,”12 potential clients post questions seeking legal advice under various legal
topics, and attorneys can provide legal advice by posting a reply. The potential also
exists for attorneys to participate in Internet “chat rooms”13 where they would respond in
real time to posts seeking legal information.14 In addition to these third party operated
Web sites, some attorneys are developing practices where they communicate with clients
solely through their firm Web site or e-mail.15
Electronic representations of clients, or what this article loosely terms “elawyering,” are part of a larger, emerging trend among the legal profession to segment or
“unbundle”16 legal services in an attempt to serve the largely unmet legal needs of people
with moderate to low incomes.17 In the past, states have had differing views on the

11

See, e.g., www.lawyers.com, www.legalmatch.com. For a discussion of how an attorney-client
relationship can be created through such Web sites, see infra Section II. C.
12
An Internet “bulletin board” is “an electronic bulletin board on a network where electronic messages may
be posted and browsed by users or delivered to e-mail boxes.” Ill. State Bar Ass’n Advisory Op. 96-10
(1997). See also Brad Hunt, Comment, Lawyers in Cyberspace: Legal Malpractice on Computer Bulletin
Boards, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 553, 554 (1996) (describing “bulletin boards” as “notice boards in
cyberspace where people discuss legal issues and ask and answer questions about the law”). A
“newsgroup” is an online discussion forum “categorized by subject, in which people post and read
messages” on a Web site. Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace, 49 Duke L.J.
147, 151 (1999). See also Ill. State Bar Ass’n Advisory Op. 96-10 (describing a “newsgroup” as “a type of
bulletin board service in which users can exchange information on a particular subject”). Effectively,
“bulletin boards” and “newsgroups” are terms for very similar, if not exactly the same, Internet activity.
Therefore, this article will use the term Internet “bulletin board” to refer to both types of activity from this
point forward.
13
A “chat room” is a “simultaneous or ‘real time’ bulletin board or newsgroup among users who send their
questions or comments over the Internet.” Ill. State Bar Ass’n Advisory Op. 96-10. See also Lanctot,
supra note 12, at 152 (describing a “chat room” as a different version of a newsgroup “in which two or
more individuals may communicate in ‘real time,’ receiving responses on the screen as soon as they are
typed in”).
14
See infra Section II. A. for a more in-depth description of electronic bulletin boards and chat rooms that
allow attorneys to provide legal advice to users.
15
See infra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
16
“Unbundling” of legal services involves “a lawyer and client [agreeing] to limit representation to
discrete, specified tasks.” Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice 100 (2004). See also Hansen, supra note 8,
at 72 (describing unbundling of legal services as situations where a “lawyer contracts to perform specific,
limited work for the client without taking on responsibility for the entire case”).
17
See Hansen, supra note 8, at 72 (noting that “since 2000, six states[, California, Colorado, Florida,
Maine, Washington and Wyoming,] have formally adopted various changes in their ethics cods or civil
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acceptability of nontraditional forums for attorneys to provide advice to clients.18 States
have already taken differing views on whether it is acceptable for an attorney to engage
in electronic representations of clients.19 Furthermore, practices in which attorneys
predominantly use the Internet to communicate with clients enable attorneys more easily
to represent people that are physically located in other jurisdictions where the attorney
may not have a license to practice law. Therefore, determining what jurisdiction’s law
applies to such attorney conduct could be very important in deciding whether this activity
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. Even if states allow such representations,
various states may afford clients with different protections and require attorneys to take
different precautions when involved in an electronic representation of a client. Therefore,
the particular jurisdiction’s ethics rules that apply to such electronic representations can
be further important in determining the exact duties of an attorney.
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) recently amended the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) to deal with various attorney multi-jurisdictional

procedure rules to accommodate unbundling and assisted pro se representation” and “at least 11 other states
have begun to study the issue actively”).
18
See Lanctot, supra note12 , at 218 (stating that “each time that lawyers have sought to adapt existing
media to answer legal questions posed by laypeople, the organized bar has moved to regulate—potentially
out of existence—such activity” and going on to examine how different states have treated nontraditional
forums for attorneys to provide legal advice where the attorney has limited ability to follow up on the
advice given or to ask follow up questions of the client).
19
Compare D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm. Op. 316 (2002) (allowing “lawyers to take part in online chat
rooms and similar arrangements through which attorneys engage in back-and-forth communications, in
‘real time” or nearly real time, with Internet users seeking legal information,” but advising attorneys that “if
an attorney-client relationship is formed through cyberspace communications” the “relationship brings to
bear all of the responsibilities and benefits defined under the D.C. Rules governing attorney-client
relationships”), and N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 709 (1998) (finding that “using the
Internet to take orders for trademark searches, conduct trademark searches, render legal opinions and file
trademark applications is analogous to conducting a law practice by telephone or facsimile machine and is
likewise permissible, subject to the same restrictions applicable to communication by those means”) with
Ariz. Comm.on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 97-04 (1997) (stating that “lawyers should not answer
specific legal questions from lay people through the Internet unless the question presented is of a general
nature and the advice given is not fact-specific”), and Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. A-00-1
(prohibiting “an attorney’s participation in a chat room” as a direct, “in person” solicitation).
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practice issues, including Model Rule 8.5(b), which governs choice of ethics law.20
Given how courts and state ethics committees have construed prior versions of Model
Rule 8.5(b), 21 courts likely will interpret the current language of this rule and its safe
harbor provision to apply the legal ethics rules of the state in which the attorney is located
to all electronic representations.22 This raises concerns under the “dormant” aspect of the
Commerce Clause.
The dormant commerce clause prevents states from promulgating legislation or
regulations that frustrate or inhibit trade between states, even in the absence of
Congressional legislation.23 When a state’s regulations prohibit activity that does not
occur or have significant effect within its physical boundaries, this often violates the
dormant commerce clause.24 If in the context of Internet representations courts construe
Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) always to apply the legal ethics rules of the state in which the
lawyer is physically located, it is not clear that state has a significant enough interest,
under a dormant commerce clause analysis, to prohibit, or even regulate, this type of
representation in most situations.25 This occurs because often the effect of an electronic
representation will be born wholly in the other state where the client is located, and this is

20

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5, 8.5 (2002). See also infra Section III. D. (explaining the recent
amendments to Model Rule 8.5(b)).
21
See infra Section IV.
22
See infra notes 181–184 and accompanying text.
23
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945) (“For hundreds of years it has been accepted
constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords
some protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such cases, where
Congress has not acted, [the United States Supreme Court], and not the state legislature, is under the
commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests.”)
24
See infra notes 194, 209–210 and accompanying text.
25
See infra Section VII. B. 2.
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the state whose ethical regime would end up being ignored under the likely interpretation
of the current language of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2).26
A more sound choice of ethics rule under the dormant commerce clause would be
to use the current language of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) without the safe harbor language that
will result in the application of the ethics regime of the attorney’s home jurisdiction in all
situations.27 Another option would be to retain the safe harbor but define key terms in the
rule to focus the analysis on the location of the client affected by the legal representation
and the jurisdiction where the legal advice provided in the representation is acted upon
and takes effect.28 Either option would allow for the application of ethics rules of the
jurisdiction where the client is physically located in situations when the most significant
effect from the representation is felt in the client’s home jurisdiction.29 This state has a
much more significant interest in protecting the resident client from incompetent and
potentially damaging legal representations.30 Consequently, this jurisdiction more
properly should determine the manner in which attorneys can represent its residents and
whether any constraints should be placed on circumscribed and non-traditional
representations, if it decides to allow them at all.31 In this manner, the state of the client’s
residence, more often than not, would balance the risks of this more limited type of
Internet legal representation against the potential to more effectively meet the legal needs
of moderate and low income residents.

26

See infra Section VII. C.
See infra Section VIII.
28
See id.
29
See id.
30
See infra Section VII. B. 1.
31
See infra Section VIII.
27
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II.

THE GROWTH OF E-LAWYERING

A.

The Different Types of E-Lawyering

Attorney conduct on the Internet can occur in four main type of contexts: in chat
rooms, on bulletin boards, through a law firm web site or through e-mail
communications. In some electronic representations of a client, an attorney might even
engage in a combination of these activities. Activity in an Internet chat room or on an
Internet bulletin board involves a potential client posting a question seeking advice on a
particular legal topic and then receiving responses in subsequent posts from other
individuals who have registered with the web site.32 Examples of the particular legal
topics into which a bulletin board may be divided include “Accident and Injury Law,”
“Consumer & General Practice Law,” “Family Law,” and “Real Estate Law,” among
others.33 After having received a response, the person making the initial post then can
respond to questions presented in the subsequent posts or ask for clarification of
information that others have provided. On some sites, such as on freeadvice.com, the
person making the initial legal inquiry is required to indicate the jurisdiction in which
they are located.34 Some Web sites providing chat rooms or bulletin boards are free to
visitors of the site, often such sites provide other services such as a directory of attorneys
in a particular area,35 while others charge a fee to users of the site.36

32

See, e.g, www.freeadvice.com. See also D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 316 (2002) (describing a
chat room exchange between an individual seeking advice on immigration law and a responsive post from
an attorney); Lanctot, supra note 12, at 152-53 (describing Web sites with bulletin boards that “encourage
laypeople to post legal questions, identifying their state of residence, and suggest that lawyers who are
licensed to practice in those states post responses”); Hunt, supra note 12, at 554 (“Legal bulletin boards are
notice boards in cyberspace where people discuss legal issues and ask and answer questions about the
law.”).
33
These examples are provided from www.freeadvice.com.
34
www.freeadvice.com.
35
See, e.g., www.lawyers.com, www.legalmatch.com.
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The difference between an Internet chat room and an Internet bulletin board is
that the communications in the chat room occur in real time.37 Thus, the posts in a chat
room occur very rapidly one after another. On an Internet bulletin board, posts occur
more slowly over several hours or even days. Therefore, the amount of time in which an
attorney would have to consider a potential client’s post and then form and post an
answer to the request for legal information would be much quicker in a chat room than on
an Internet bulletin board.
In addition to communicating with potential clients in chat rooms or bulletin
boards, some attorneys are engaging in electronic lawyering in a more formal manner by
allowing clients to communicate with an attorney through a particular part of the firm’s
web site or filling out a client intake form for potential clients on the firm web site or a
web site run by a third party.38 Some Web sites allow clients to fill out their own legal
forms in a “decision-tree format” and then have an attorney review the documents before

36

See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 316 n. 3 (2002) (describing one “multi-purpose site” offering real
time chats with attorneys for $15 for a single chat or an annual subscription to the chat room for $30 per
month and another Web site that “charged $10 for a one-week subscription”); Darren Franklin, Hanging a
Shingle on the Information Superhighway: Legal Advice on the Internet and Problems of Prohibited Client
Solicitation and Unintended Attorney-Client Relationships, 2001 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 2, ¶4,
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/01_STLR_2/index.htm (describing USLaw.com which “offers a
$9.95 single-use ($24.95 annual subscription) ‘Ask a Lawyer’ feature that lets users have ‘private one-onone live chats with licensed lawyers’”).
37
See Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. A-00-1 (2000) (stating that “the term ‘chat room’ refers to a
real time communication between computer users”); Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct,
Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997) (stating that a “‘chat’ group is a simultaneous or ‘real time’ bulletin board or
newsgroup among users who send their questions or comments over the Internet”); Utah State Bar Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 97-10 (1997) (stating that communication in a “chat room” involves “simultaneous
participation of several users in a real-time exchange of written messages” that “is more analogous to an inperson conversation due to its direct, confrontational nature”).
38
See Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 2005-168 (2005)
(describing a hypothetical firm web site that allows prospective clients to make their initial inquiry to the
firm by fill out an electronic form asking for the inquirer’s name and contact information as well as a short
description of his or her legal problem and any initial questions the inquirer has); The client intake forms
available on Web sites can range from a one page form asking for very basic information, see the intake
form on www.njdebtrelief.com, to several screens that ask for, among other things, a detailed description of
the client’s situation and needs, see the intake screens for www.legalmatch.com.
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the client receives the documents.39 Other sites allow clients to question attorneys on
discrete questions for a flat fee.40
Furthermore, some attorneys are engaging in more traditional practices where the
attorney provides a fuller array of legal services but all of the communications with a
client occur through the firm Web site or through e-mail.41 Some attorneys are finding
that such practices are more efficient and also allow them to find new clients without
having to battle for clients in a more limited and immediate geographic area.42 However,
engaging in such representations increases the likelihood that the client will be located in
a different jurisdiction and have a legal question pertaining to the law of that particular
jurisdiction rather than the law of the jurisdiction in which the attorney is located and
licensed.43

39

Terry Carter, Law Tech Generations: Newer Versions of Firm Web Sites Boldly Go Where Few Law
Firms Have Gone Before, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2004, at 22.
40
See Franklin, supra note , at ¶¶ 5-6 (describing “www.legalmatch.com, where visitors can get legal
advice for $39.95 a question” and “the LegalEase Home Page” which “charges visitors $25 to answer their
immigration law questions”).
41
See, e.g., Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 00-4 (2000) (allowing attorney “to provide limited, online legal services to Florida residents on simple matters not requiring office visits or court appearances”
such as “simple wills, incorporation papers, real estate contracts, residential leases and uncontested marital
agreements” as long as “the attorney complies with the ethics rules”). N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on
Prof’l Ethics, Op. 709 (1998) (finding that “using the Internet to take orders for trademark searches,
conduct trademark searches, render legal opinions and file trademark applications is analogous to
conducting a law practice by telephone or facsimile machine and is likewise permissible, subject to the
same restrictions applicable to communication by those means”); Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal
Ethics, Op. 1791 (2003) (allowing an attorney to engage in a bankruptcy practice in which he would
communicate with clients without any face-to-face meetings but “via electronic communication so long as
the content and caliber of those services otherwise comport with the duties and competence and
communication”).
42
See Carter, supra note 10, at 35 (discussing an attorney who screens potential clients through e-mail
“which has added the value of being more efficient than fielding phone calls” ); Hornsby, supra note 8, at
13, 16 (stating that providing “on-line advice overcomes geographic obstacles and provides a convenient
alternative to a face-to-face encounter” and that “using a digital strategy to expand the geographic area
would allow the lawyer access to a larger volume of unbundled cases without consuming a larger
percentage of the marketplace for the immediate jurisdiction”).
43
Hunt, supra note 12, at 556 (“[L]awyers in cyberspace will probably receive many questions from people
who live in states (or even nations, given the international nature of cyberspace) other than those in which
they are licensed to practice law.”).

Copyright © 2006 by Michael W. Loudenslager

12
B.

Demand for E-Lawyering

The demand for legal services delivered over the Internet springs from the great
unmet need for legal representation of poor and moderate income Americans. As far as
citizens of little means are concerned, legal services offices only are able to address “less
than a fifth of the needs of eligible clients.”44 Of the poor who are able to obtain legal
assistance through such offices, many “must wait over two years before seeing a lawyer
for matters like divorce,” which don’t qualify as emergencies.45 Furthermore, such
services are not available at all for many people “just over the poverty line” who cannot
afford an attorney but who do not meet income eligibility requirements.46
With regard to the middle class, one survey indicated that less than half of
moderate income households with a legal need actually consulted an attorney.47
According to the same survey, less than forty percent of moderate income households
used the courts to address their legal problems.48 Almost a quarter of the households
surveyed handled the problem on their own while a little over a quarter took no action at
all.49 Moreover, “[t]wo thirds of surveyed Americans [agreed] that it [was] ‘not
affordable to bring a case in court.’”50 Another survey conducted in Maryland indicated

44

Rhode, supra note 16, at 13.
Id.
46
Id.
47
Hornsby, supra note 8, at 2 (citing the results of a 1992 survey conducted by the ABA indicating that 43
percent of moderate income households with a legal need consulted an attorney). See also Rhode, supra
note 16, at 79 (citing same survey and stating that “about two-thirds of the civil legal needs of moderateincome consumers were not taken to lawyers or the judicial system”).
48
Hornsby, supra note 8, at 2. See also Modest Means Task Force, ABA Section of Litig., Handbook on
Limited Scope Legal Assistance 10 (2003) (referring to ABA study finding that “7 out 10 low-income
households and 6 out of 10 moderate-income households that had legal problems did not use our legal
system to resolve them”).
49
Hornsby, supra note8 , at 2 (citing ABA survey indicating that twenty-three percent (23%) of households
surveyed dealt with the legal problem on their own and twenty-six percent (26%) of households took no
action at all).
50
Rhode, supra note 16, at 80. See also Cristina L. Underwood, Comment, Balancing Consumer Interests
in a Digital Age: A New Approach to Regulating the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 437,
45
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that almost three quarters of the people in the middle class “no longer [contacted] an
attorney when faced with a legal problem.”51
The lack of affordability of legal counsel has resulted in a large increase in the
number of people filing cases pro se.52 Especially in the areas of housing, bankruptcy
and family law, as well as in small claims court, more people than not handle their
lawsuits without using an attorney.53 “In some jurisdictions, over four-fifths of cases
involving these matters involve self-represented ‘pro se’ individuals.”54 This increase in
self-representation further enhances individuals’ dissatisfaction with the legal system.
Only approximately one-half of people of middle income were happy with the result
when they handled their legal problems on their own, and only one-third of the
individuals who took no action were pleased with the result.55 This contrasts with the
two-thirds of people satisfied with the outcome among those who consulted attorneys to
deal with their legal problems.56
One effort to address the unmet legal needs of so many Americans has been to
develop technological solutions.57 The use of Internet representations is one way in
which technology can help middle, and even many low, income individuals obtain some
442 (2004) (“Many low- and moderate-income households simply cannot afford the cost of personal legal
services.”).
51
Rhode, supra note 16, at 79.
52
See Hornsby, supra note 8, at 3 (citing same Maryland survey that found that “57 percent of pro se
litigants [in Maryland] proceeded pro se because they could not afford an attorney”).
53
Rhode, supra note 16, at 14. In uncontested divorces, between sixty and ninety percent of cases involve
at least one pro se party. Id. at 82. See also Modest Means Task Force, supra note 48, at 8 (stating that
“[n]ationally, in three or four out of every five [domestic relations] cases one of the two parties is
unrepresented” and that “both parties are unrepresented in two or three out of every five cases”).
54
Rhode, supra note 16, at 14.
55
Id. at 80. See also Modest Means Task Force, supra note 48, at 14 n.30 (referring to Oregon survey
indicating that about seventy-five percent (75%) of people with a legal need who didn’t retain counsel were
“dissatisfied with the outcome of the case”).
56
Rhode, supra note 16, at 80.
57
See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., How to Practice Law with Computers 59 (3d ed. 1998) (noting that the lack of
affordability of legal services by middle class Americans has created the potential “for deploying computer
technology creatively to define entirely new legal services products for ordinary citizens”).
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degree of legal advice instead of addressing their legal problems wholly on their own.58
Many types of e-lawyering that currently exist represent part of a larger attempt to serve
unmet legal needs by “unbundling” legal services.59 Under such arrangements, an
attorney agrees with a client to complete discrete legal tasks rather than carrying out a
whole case from beginning to end.60 The idea is that many people who now proceed pro
se, or opt out of the legal system altogether, would be able to afford and would use
reasonably priced limited representations if this were an option.61 The ABA recently
modified the Model Rules to better allow for such discrete task representations,62 and

58

See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 316 (2002) (“Advocates of the provision of low-cost legal advice
through on-line chat rooms and similar innovative services make the important point that these services
offer great potential for providing low-cost legal services to low and moderate income persons.”); Lanctot,
supra note 12, at 250 (stating that providing legal advice over the Internet “has the potential to serve the
unmet legal needs of millions of Americans of low and moderate income who cannot afford to hire
attorneys, at a time when the number of lawyers in the United States continues to expand”); Hunt, supra
note 12, at 555 (“Legal information is also considerably less expensive when obtained in cyberspace rather
than in person.”)
59
See Lanctot, supra note 12, at 253 (stating that “[i]n many ways, giving specific legal advice to clients
online, while expressly disclaiming any additional responsibilities, is a classic example of discrete task
representation” and that “[b]y unbundling these services, the lawyer can give at least limited assistance to
the person who needs help . . . and the client can obtain recourse that he otherwise could not obtain”).
60
See Modest Means Task Force, supra note 48, at 4 (describing “limited scope legal assistance” as “a
designated service or services, rather than the full package of traditionally offered services”); Rhode, supra
note 16, at 100 (describing unbundling of legal services as where “a lawyer and client agree to limit
representation to discrete, specified tasks”); Lanctot, supra note 12, at 253 (“The model is that of a menu of
legal tasks from which the client, in consultation with the lawyer, is permitted to purchase only the services
that he needs or can afford.”); Hansen, supra note 8, at 72 (describing unbundling of legal services as a
“lawyer [contracting] to perform specific, limited work for the client without taking on responsibility for
the entire case”).
Several other terms are used to describe this type of representation including “‘discrete task’
representation, ‘limited scope assistance’, or just ‘limited assistance’ or ‘limited representation.’” Modest
Means Task Force, supra note 48, at 5. “Common forms of unbundled legal services involve court
appearances or trial representation; telephone, Internet or brief in-person advice; and assistance with
negotiations, pretrial discovery, or document preparation.” Rhode, supra note 16, at 100.
61
Modest Means Task Force, supra note 48, at 9, 11 (stating that “[m]any pro se litigants have enough
disposable income to pay for the limited representation they need” and that “[m]any of those who opt out,
or who are forced out, of the legal system would use the legal system to resolve their disputes, and retain
lawyers to represent them, if lawyers offered them reasonable limited-service options”). “Limited
representation, therefore, is an important means to provide people with access to justice.” Id. at 11.
62
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rule 1.2(c) (2002) (stating that a “lawyer may limit the scope of the
representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed
consent”); ABA Comm’n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Report with Recommendation to
the House of Delegates 23 (Aug. 2001) (stating that the intent of revising Rule 1.2(c) was “to provide a
framework within which lawyers may expand access to legal services by providing limited but nonetheless
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more and more state disciplinary authorities formally are approving of such
representations.63 Therefore, providing limited legal advice to clients over the Internet
potentially could become an important part of the effort to satisfy unmet legal needs
through the unbundled or discrete task representation model.
C.

Formation of Attorney-Client Relationship Through E-Lawyering

When attorneys interact over the Internet in a more limited manner with potential
clients, such as in an Internet chat room or on a bulletin board, the issue arises of
when the interaction between the attorney and the potential client forms an actual
attorney-client relationship. This is important because if an attorney-client relationship is
not formed several of the ethical obligations owed to a client will not apply.64
Consequently, at least one jurisdiction’s ethics opinion on electronic representations
advises attorneys to post disclaimers stating that an attorney-client relationship is not

valuable legal service to low or moderate-income persons who otherwise would be unable to obtain
counsel”). Moreover, many of the ethics opinions dealing with unbundled legal services “identify Model
Rule 1.2 as the source of authority for limited-service agreements.” Modest Means Task Force, supra note
48, at 86.
63
See, e.g., Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 05-06 at 5-6 (2005) (approving of “limited scope
representations” as long as certain conditions are met); Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 101
(1998) (allowing an attorney to provide “unbundled legal services in both litigation and non-litigation
matters” as long as the attorney can make a sufficient “inquiry into and analysis of” the applicable law and
facts); Tenn. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2005-F-151 (2005) (acknowledging that Rule 1.2(c)
“allows a lawyer to limit the scope of a client’s representation if the client consents and if the limitation is
reasonable under the circumstances” and approving of Pro Se clinic where attorneys provide “limited
advice and assistance without becoming counsel of record” to domestic relations litigants). See also
Modest Means Task Force, supra note 48, at 116-20, 124-27 (describing how Colorado, Maine and
Washington have revised their ethics rules to facilitate the provision of unbundled legal services); Hansen,
supra note 8, at 72 (noting that “since 2000, six states[, California, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Washington
and Wyoming,] have formally adopted various changes in their ethics codes or civil procedure rules to
accommodate unbundling and assisted pro se representation” and “at least 11 other states have begun to
study the issue actively”).
64
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 (2000) (Introductory Note) (“A fundamental
distinction is involved between clients, to whom lawyers owe many duties, and nonclients, to who lawyers
owe fewer duties. . . . Prospective and former clients receive certain protections, but not all of those due to
clients.”).
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created through the activity on the Web site concerned.65 However, Professor Catherine
Lanctot has concluded that such disclaimers will be ineffective if the subsequent activity
of the attorney and client indicate that the parties actually have formed an attorney-client
relationship.66
Moreover, Professor Lanctot concludes that much of the activity that occurs
between attorneys and clients in chat rooms and bulletin boards would be sufficient to
form an attorney-client relationship.67 Generally, an attorney-client relationship arises
when: (1) an individual manifests an intent for an attorney to provide legal services to
them; and (2) that attorney either (a) manifests to the individual an intent to provide the
legal services or (b) the attorney “fails to manifest a lack of consent” to provide the legal
services to the individual knowing, or under the circumstances reasonably should know,
that the individual “reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services.”68 Much of
the activity on Internet chat rooms and bulletin boards likely will form an attorney

65

See D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 302 (2000) (suggesting the use of disclaimers “on ‘click through’ boxes
or pages, which require visitors to verify that they have read important information by clicking on a
specified area of the screen before proceeding” in an opinion addressing an Internet Web site seeking
plaintiffs for class action lawsuits).
66
Lanctot, supra note 12, at 193 ( “I expect that neither courts nor bar disciplinary authorities are likely to
be sympathetic to cyberspace attorneys who rely on disclaimers as all-purpose shields. In my view, if the
legal advice given is specifically tailored to the factual circumstances presented, that conduct will suffice to
create an attorney-client relationship, regardless of what boilerplate disclaimers the lawyer attaches to the
advice.”).
However, Professor Lanctot goes on to conclude that disclaimers might be effective in limiting the
scope of an electronic representation. Id. at 195 (“[A] disclaimer that limited the online lawyer’s
obligations to providing a competent legal response, without further requiring the lawyer to take steps to
protect the client’s interest, arguably could be consistent with [the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers], if the circumstances of the
exchange reflected informed consent.”). Nevertheless, “there are core attributes of the attorney-client
relationship, such as basic competency, that cannot be bargained away.” Id. See also Modest Means Task
Force, supra note 48, at 8 (stating that “lawyers owe the same duties of loyalty, confidentiality, diligence,
and competence to limited-service clients that they do to full-service clients”).
67
See Lanctot, supra note 12, at 184 (“In short, lawyers who provide specific legal advice online may find
it difficult at some future point to persuade a court or bar counsel that they did not intend to incur any
professional obligations by answering questions in cyberspace.”).
68
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 (2000). See also Lanctot, supra note 12, at
168-69 (setting out and explaining the Restatement test for formation of an attorney-client relationship).
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relationship in the following manner. First, the site user posts a legal question
manifesting an intent to have a lawyer perform legal services, specifically by asking for
legal advice and a recommendation on a course of action given the facts of the poster’s
situation.69 Second, an attorney manifests his or her intent to perform the requested legal
services by actual performance, particularly by providing specific legal advice in
response to the original user’s post.70 Alternatively, an attorney could form an attorneyclient relationship by posting a reply to the original site user’s post knowing that the user
will rely on the legal advice provided.71 Thus, as long as the attorney is providing legal
advice specifically tailored to the user’s situation, an attorney-client relationship will be
formed.72 Moreover, even if an attorney limits the objectives in the representation, this
does not do away with the obligations that an attorney owes a client with regard to those
specific objectives.73

69

Lanctot, supra note 12, at 169 (“[T]he online posting of a specific legal question by a layperson
manifests the intent to have a lawyer perform legal services—specifically, to provide legal advice.”).
70
Id. (“The lawyer can also manifest consent by performance—that is, by providing the requested legal
advice.”).
71
Id. at 169-70 (“[F]urnishing specific legal advice in response to the question, without more, can
constitute consent regardless of the lawyer’s subjective intent” because the attorney can “still incur the
obligations of a professional relationship if the lawyer knows or should reasonably know that the questioner
is reasonably relying on the lawyer’s advice.”). See also Franklin, supra note 36, at 14 (“An attorney-client
relationship, therefore, does not require an explicit agreement; it may arise by implication from a Web site
visitor’s reasonable expectation of legal representation and the online attorney’s failure to dispel those
expectations.”).
72
Lanctot, supra note 12, at 183 (“[G]iving specific legal advice in response to a set of particular facts is
the hallmark of the practice of law, while providing general information is not. Second, it is reasonable for
a putative client to rely on advice that is specifically tailored to his [or her] particular request, and the
courts are clear that it is the reasonable belief of the client that will govern.”). See also Ill. State Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997) (“[L]awyers participating in chat groups or other
on-line services that could involve offering personalized legal advice to anyone who happens to be
connected to the service should be mindful that the recipients of such advise [sic] are the lawyer’s clients,
with the potential benefits and burdens of that relationship.”); Or. State Bar Ass’n Bd. of Governors,
Formal Op. 1991-101 (1991) (“In essence, the practice of law involves the application of a general body of
legal knowledge to the problem of a specific entity or individual.”); Underwood, supra note 50, at 450-52,
462-63 (2004) (describing the test that the majority of state courts use to determine whether the practice of
law has occurred as examining whether the advice provided is tailored to the specific circumstances of the
consumer).
73
See Modest Means Task Force, supra note 48, at 8 (stating that “lawyers owe the same duties of loyalty,
confidentiality, diligence, and competence to limited-service clients that they do to full-service clients”);
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Even if an attorney-client relationship is not formed, though, an attorney may still
owe certain duties of confidentiality and loyalty to prospective clients. With regard to
information learned from a prospective client in the initial consultation, Model Rule 1.18
states that an attorney owes a prospective client the same duty of confidentiality owed to
former clients.74 The attorney also cannot represent someone with materially adverse
interests to the prospective client in “the same or a substantially related matter” if the
attorney received “significantly harmful” information from the prospective client.75 The
rule further imputes this disqualification to other members of the attorney’s firm.76 An
attorney’s firm can avoid disqualification if the attorney “took reasonable steps to avoid
exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to determine
whether to represent the prospective client,” the attorney is appropriately screened, the
attorney receives no part of the fee from the matter, and the prospective client receives

Hansen, supra note 8, at 72 (stating that in the larger context of unbundled legal services generally “[m]any
of the [ethics] opinions also agree that an attorney-client relationship still exists when legal services are
provided on a limited basis”). But see Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rule 1.2 cmt. 7 (2002) (“Although
an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent
representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
74
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18(b) (2003) (“Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a
lawyer who has had discussions with a prospective client shall not use or reveal information learned in the
consultation, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to the information of a former client.”). See
also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 15(1)(a) (2000) (stating that when an attorney
has discussions with a prospective client about “the possibility of their forming a client-lawyer relationship
for a matter and no such relationship ensues,” the attorney must “not subsequently disclose confidential
information learned in the consultation, except to the extent permitted with respect to confidential
information of a client or former client”).
Model Rule 1.18 defines a “prospective client” as a “person who discusses with a lawyer the
possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
R. 1.18(a) (2003). Comment 2 to the rule goes on to state that someone who communicates “unilaterally to
a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming
a client-lawyer relationship, is not a ‘prospective client.’” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18 cmt. 2
(2003).
75
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18(c) (2003).
76
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18(c) (2003).
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written notice.77 Disqualification alternatively can be avoided if the attorney receives
written “informed consent” from both parties concerned.78 Comment 5 to the rule further
states that an attorney can avoid disqualification if the attorney expressly conditions
discussions with the prospective client upon that individual’s “informed consent that no
information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a
different client in the matter.”79 Furthermore, an attorney can avoid the duty of
confidentiality if the client expressly agrees to the attorney’s “subsequent use of
information received from the prospective client.”80
Therefore, when an attorney has contact with an individual seeking legal advice
over the Internet, he or she potentially can avoid incurring the obligations owed to
prospective clients in one of two ways. First, the attorney can make sure that he or she
initially learns only enough information to engage in a proper conflicts check regarding
the matter. Such information could be restricted to the potential party names, any other
significant actors concerned in the matter, and the general subject matter of the
representation.81 Presumably, this will decrease the chance that the attorney will receive
“significantly harmful” information before discovering that a conflict with a current or
previous client exists.82

77

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18(d)(2) (2003). See also Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers § 15(2)(a) (2000) (stating that an attorney’s firm may avoid disqualification due to
contact with a prospective client if the “personally prohibited lawyer takes reasonable steps to avoid
exposure to confidential information other than information appropriate to determine whether to represent
the prospective client” and the firm properly screens the attorney).
78
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18(d)(1) (2003).
79
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18 cmt. 5 (2003).
80
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18 cmt. 5 (2003).
81
See Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 2005-168 (2005)
(stating that when a prospective client contacted an attorney through an intake form on the firm’s web site
about a potential divorce representation, the attorney would need to know information such as “the names
of the parties, children, [and] former spouses” in order to perform a proper conflicts check).
82
See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18 cmt. 4 (2003) (“In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying
information from a prospective client, a lawyer considering whether or not to undertake a new matter
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Second, the attorney could have the prospective client expressly consent to waive
the obligations which Model Rule 1.18 imposes. On an intake form on a firm Web site,
this could be accomplished by requiring the prospective client to click on a button
directly under language waiving these obligations in order for that individual’s
information to be transmitted to the law firm.83 However, language simply disclaiming
any “attorney-client relationship” or “confidential relationship” may insufficient to do
away with the Rule 1.18 obligations.84 Instead, one state’s ethics committee has stated
that to be effective a waiver must be written in “plain-language” and expressly state that
“the attorney will have no duty to keep confidential the information” transmitted by the
prospective client.85 Therefore, unless an attorney acts proactively to either limit the
amount of information received or to have the individual seeking legal advice waive such
obligations under express and plain language, an attorney that has contact with an
individual seeking legal advice through the Internet at a minimum would incur the duties
owed to prospective clients, irrespective of whether an actual attorney-client relationship
is formed. Moreover, it may be difficult for an attorney to implement either method
discussed above in the context of an Internet chat room or bulletin board. Nevertheless,
for the purposes of the analysis in the rest of this article, I will assume that an attorney-

should limit the initial interview to only such information as reasonably appears necessary for that
purpose.”).
83
See Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 2005-168 (2005)
(providing an example of some waiver language on an Internet client intake form).
84
See Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 2005-168 (2005) (“We
do not believe that a prospective client’s agreement to Law Firm’s terms prevented a duty of confidentiality
from arising on the facts before us, because Law Firm’s disclosures to [the prospective client] were not
adequate to defeat her reasonable belief that she was consulting Law Firm for the purpose of retaining Law
Firm.”). Cf. Barton v. U..S. Dist. Ct., 410 F.3d 1104, 1107, 1109-12 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that attorneyclient privilege applied to information submitted through Internet questionnaire seeking information on
potential members of class action despite disclaimer stating that filling out the questionnaire did “not
constitute a request for legal advice and [the person filling out the form was] not forming an attorney-client
relationship by submitting this information”).
85
See Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 2005-168 (2005).
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client relationship is formed by the Internet activity of the attorney and potential client
concerned.
In deciding whether to allow such representations to occur through the Internet,
disciplinary authorities must wrestle with the following issues: (1) whether the initial
communications between the parties constitute an improper solicitation by an attorney of
a potential client;86 (2) whether the attorney can conduct a proper conflicts check before
the attorney enters into the representation;87 (3) if the communications occur in a forum

86

Compare Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 97-04 at 3 (1997) (“Communication with a
potential client via cyberspace should not be considered either a prohibited telephone or in-person contact
because there is not the same element of confrontation/immediacy as with prohibited mediums. A potential
client reading his or her e-mail, or even participating in a ‘chat room’ has the option of not responding to
unwanted solicitations.”); D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 302 (“The potentially greater immediacy of ‘real
time’ communications in chat rooms, as opposed to other forms of written communications, may give rise
to concerns similar to those about ‘in person solicitation in circumstances or through means that are not
conducive to intelligent, rational decisions’ D.C. Rule 7.1, comment [5]. . . . On the other hand, attorney
communications with potential clients in chat rooms are probably less potentially coercive than face-to-face
communications.”); Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997) (“On the
other hand, lawyer participation in an electronic bulletin board, chat room, or similar service, may implicate
Rule 7.3, which governs solicitation, the direct contact with prospective clients. The Committee does not
believe that merely posting general comments on a bulletin board or chat group considered solicitation.”);
and Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 98-6 (1998) (“In the opinion of the Committee,
conversation interactions with persons on the Internet do not constitute improper solicitations, but in any
one particular case the interaction mahy evolve in such a way that it could be considered as such.”) with
Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. A-00-1 (2000) (prohibiting “an attorney’s participation in a chat
room in order to solicit professional employment” as a in-person solicitation); Mich. Standing Comm. on
Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-276 (1996) (“[I]f a lawyer is participating in interactive communication
on the Internet, carrying on an immediate electronic conversation. If the communication was initiated by
the lawyer without invitation, such ‘real time’ communications about the lawyer’s services would be
analogous to direct solicitation, outside the activity permitted by MRPC 7.3.”); Utah State Bar Ethics
Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 97-10 (1997) (finding “that an attorney’s advertising and solicitation
through a chat group are ‘in person’ communications under Rule 7.3(a) and are accordingly restricted by
the provisions of that rule” although finding that postings to “newsgroups” are “analogous to placing an
advertisement for legal services in a narrow-interest magazine or newspaper” and are allowable); and
W.Va. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Op. 98-03 (1998) (finding “that solicitations via real time communications
on the computer, such as a chat room, should be treated similar to [prohibited] telephone and in-person
solicitations”).
87
See Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 97-04 at 4 (stating that attorneys probably should not
respond to specific legal questions posted in “chat rooms” or “news groups” because, in part, of “the
inability to screen for a potential conflict with an existing client (in violation of ER 1.7)”); N.Y. State Bar
Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 709 (1998) (“Practicing law for clients by means of the Internet does
not give rise to any exemption from this fundamental obligation to avoid conflicts and not to undertake a
new representation without checking to assure that it does not create an impermissible conflict.”); Ohio Bd.
of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 99-9 (1999) (“As an attorney checks for conflicts when a
client calls or comes to his office seeking legal services, an attorney must check for conflicts when a client
e-mails seeking legal advice. The on-line intake form should provide a way for the law firm to make a
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open to the public, whether the attorney can adequately protect client confidences or
alternatively whether the client can waive his or her right to confidentiality in an
informed manner, or at all, in this setting;88 and (4) whether an attorney can competently
represent a client in this manner.89 If after grappling with these concerns a jurisdiction
decides to allow electronic representations, the jurisdiction must decide what precautions
to require an attorney to take to deal with these issues and protect consumers in the best
manner possible. Furthermore, it is very possible that different jurisdictions will place

conflicts check prior to reviewing the legal question.”); Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 98-6
(stating that “in the course of an interaction with any person on the Internet an attorney/client relationship
may begin with all that such relationship implies including creation of potential conflicts of interest (see
Rules 1.7 and 1.9”); S.C. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 94-27 (stating that in an electronic representation
the “attorney must obtain sufficient information to identify his client in order to make a complete conflicts
inquiry”); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 97-10 (stating that an attorney
“[a]dvertising and [communicating] over the Internet . . may be unable to screen for potential conflicts as
required by Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10”).
88
See Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 97-04 at 4 (stating that attorneys probably should not
respond to specific legal questions posted in “chat rooms” or “news groups” because, in part, of “the
possibility of disclosing confidential information (in violation of ER 1.6”); D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Op.
302 (stating that an attorney engaging in an electronic representation of a client “must also safeguard the
secrets and confidences of that client under Rule 1.6” which may require the attorney “even if a
communication begins as a public communication in a chat room or similar exchange service, . . . to
reserve his or her communications for the eyes of a particular advice seeker only”); Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs
on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 99-9 (1999) (stating that in a legal representation through e-mail the
“confidences and secrets of the e-mail attachments must be protected under DR 4-101”); Phila. Bar Ass’n
Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 98-6 (stating that “in the course of an interaction with any person on the
Internet an attorney/client relationship may begin” which would include “expectations of confidentiality”);
S.C. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 94-27 (stating that “the confidentiality requirements of Rule 1.6 are
implicated by any confidential communication which occurs across electronic media, absent express waiver
by the client”); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 97-10 (stating that in communicating
with a client or prospective client over the Internet “it may be difficult to protect confidential
communications under Rules 1.6 and 1.9”).
89
D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 302 (stating that in an electronic representation of a client an “attorney must
ensure that such requirements as that of competence under D.C. Rule 1.1, diligence and zeal under Rule 1.3
and adequate communication under Rule 1.4 are met); Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline,
Op. 99-9 (“In providing answers to e-mail questions a lawyer must act competently under DR 6-101(A).”);
Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1791 (2003) (stating that with regard to a legal
representation in which an attorney communicates with a client by e-mail without in-person meetings “[s]o
long as the requisite information is given, received, analyzed and acted upon, the attorney has met his duty
of competency.”). See also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rule 1.2 cmt. 7 (2002) (stating that brief
consultation with a client before rendering legal advice may be appropriate unless “the time allotted is
insufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely.”); Lanctot, supra note 12, at 252-53 (exploring
whether a lawyer can meet his or her duty of diligence under Model Rule 1.3 “when a lawyer gives a client
specific legal advice, but does not volunteer additional information about other legal issues that might lurk
beneath the surface”).
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different requirements on attorneys when engaging in electronic representations of
clients.90
III.

HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF CHOICE OF LEGAL ETHICS LAW
BY MODEL CODE AND MODEL RULES

The American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) model ethics rules have gone from not
addressing choice of ethics law at all to basing the choice of ethics law on the jurisdiction
or jurisdictions where an attorney is licensed to basing the choice of ethics law on where
the attorney’s conduct occurred or where the predominant effect of the attorney’s conduct
arises.91 The following section discusses the history of the ABA’s treatment of choice of
ethics law in attorney disciplinary actions, or lack thereof, first in the Model Code of
Professional Conduct (“Model Code”) and then in subsequent versions of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”). This history should help a reader
appreciate why there is little case or administrative law discussing this issue and
illuminate somewhat the current language of the Model Rule’s choice of law rule.
A. Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Original 1983 Version of
Model Rule 8.5
The Model Code, which the ABA adopted in 1969,92 ignored inter-jurisdictional
conflicts of ethics law and did not contain a rule addressing choice of ethics law.93
However, this was understandable because conflicts among state ethical rules were
minimal during the period of time in which the Model Code served as the basis for most
90

See J.T. Westermeier, Ethics and the Internet, 17 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 267, 311 (2004) (stating that “[t]he
variances among states and countries in ethical rules applicable to websites and electronic communications
greatly complicates any analysis of ethical considerations” and that “there is little likelihood that uniformity
on a multi-jurisdictional basis could be achieved”).
91
See infra notes 93–127 and accompanying text.
92
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 1.11, at 1-19 (3d ed. 2003).
Although adopted in 1969, the Model Code was not to become effective until 1970. Id.
93
Ronald D. Rotunda & John S. Dzienkowski, Professional Responsibility: A Student’s Guide 2005-2006
1108 (2005) (noting that the Model Code had no counterpart to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5).
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states’ regulation of attorney conduct.94 Soon after the ABA adopted the Model Code, 49
states had adopted or taken significant steps toward adopting the Model Code in
substantial part.95 Therefore, with considerable continuity existing between state’s
ethical rules during this time , choice of ethics law was not a significant issue.96
The original 1983 version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct also
largely ignored choice of law issues.97 Model Rule 8.5, entitled “Jurisdiction,” simply
dealt with a state’s disciplinary jurisdiction and stated: “A lawyer admitted to practice in
this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction although
engaged in practice elsewhere.”98 Nevertheless, two comments to this version of Rule
8.5 obliquely dealt with choice of law issues. Comment 2 stated that if rules of

94

See Hazard, supra note 92, § 1.11, at 1-18 (“Within a few years, the Code was officially adopted – by the
courts, not merely by the bar associations – in virtually all American jurisdictions.”); Mary C. Daly,
Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional Practice – Is Model Rule 8.5 the Answer, an Answer, Or
No Answer at All?, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 715, 747 (1995) (stating that “[n]o reason existed to think about
amending the Code to address multijurisdictional conflicts since the professional standards were identical
from state to state”). However, while 49 states eventually adopted the original version of the Model Code,
many states rejected or adopted substantially different amendments to the Code than those subsequently
recommended by the ABA. Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 56-57 (1986).
95
Wolfram, supra note 94, at 56-57 (1986). Wolfram notes that this number includes states where the
Model Code “had received only unofficial state bar approval.” Id. at 56 n. 45. “Official versions of a
revised Code were not adopted in Illinois and Maine, for example, until 1980.” Id. Furthermore, some
states adopted the Model Code’s Disciplinary Rules and not its Ethical Considerations, while other states
adopted the Ethical Considerations “as legally and enforceable norms.” Hazard, supra note 92, § 1.11, at
1-20. See also Wolfram, supra note 94, at 56 (“Not at all states adopted all parts of the Code. Several
states omitted the Ethical Considerations.”).
The Model Code contained three different types of statements: “[B]road general ‘axiomatic’
principles (‘Canons’), aspirational and explanatory provisions (‘Ethical Considerations,’ referred to as
‘ECs’), and black letter rules (‘disciplinary Rules,’ referred to as ‘DRs).” Hazard, supra note 92, § 1.11, at
1-20. Wolfram notes that the Canons embodied “general concepts from which the Disciplinary Rules and
Ethical Considerations derive,” the Disciplinary Rules were “directly prescriptive,” and the Ethical
considerations were “‘aspirational in character’” and “may provide ‘interpretive guidance’” for courts or
agencies attempting to construe a Disciplinary Rule. Wolfram, supra note 94, at 58-59 (quoting the
Preliminary Statement of the Model Code).
96
See Daly, supra note 94, at 747 (stating that because “professional standards were identical from state to
state . . . the number of conflict issues brought to the attention of courts, disciplinary bodies, and state bar
associations was extremely small”).
97
See Hazard, supra note 92, § 66.4 n.1, at 66-23 (“As originally promulgated in 1983, Model Rule 8.5 did
not address the choice of law issue at all, leaving courts and disciplinary authorities to develop conflicts of
law principles on a case-by-case basis.”).
98
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 (1983).
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professional conduct in two states differed then “principles of conflicts of law may
apply.”99 Comment 3 further stated that where a lawyer “is licensed to practice law in
two jurisdictions which impose conflicting obligations, applicable rules of choice of law
may govern the situation.”100 Consequently, Rule 8.5 and its comments largely were
silent on which jurisdiction’s ethics law should apply to an attorney admitted to practice
in one state but not admitted to the bar in another state in which the attorney rendered
legal services.101
B.

1993 Version of Model Rule 8.5

In 1993, the ABA amended Model Rule 8.5.102 The title of the rule was changed
to “Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law.”103 Section (b) dealing with choice of law
issues was added104 while section (a) essentially contained the original language of the
rule dealing with disciplinary jurisdiction.105 The purpose of section (b) was to subject
any particular instance of attorney conduct to “one set of rules of professional
conduct.”106 This section of the rule divided attorney conduct into that undertaken “in

99

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 2 (1983).
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 3 (1983).
101
Cf. Daly, supra note 94, at 749 (stating that the original version of Model Rule 8.5 “is strikingly silent
about a jurisdiction’s right to discipline a lawyer not admitted to the bar who nonetheless renders legal
services within the jurisdiction.”).
102
Hazard, supra note 92, § 66.2, at 66-5; Daly, supra note 94, at 756.
103
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 (1993).
104
Hazard, supra note 92, § 66.2, at 66-5 (“The ABA amended Rule 8.5 in 1993 to add a new section (b)
addressing choice of law issues that can arise in lawyer discipline cases.”).
105
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 (1993). See also Daly, supra note 94, at 757 (“Subsection (a) of
the new Model Rule 8.5 essentially [tracked] the language of the prior rule.”). In the 1993 version of Rule
8.5, subsection (a) stated:
Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs. A
lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another
jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted for the same conduct.
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(a) (1993).
106
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 3 (1993). See also Hazard, supra note 92, § 66.4 n.1, at 6623 (stating that the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b) was “designed to ensure that, generally speaking,
only a single conduct standard will be applied, no matter which jurisdiction disciplines a respondent
lawyer”).
100
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connection with a proceeding in a court,” which was dealt with in subsection (b)(1), and
“any other conduct,” which was dealt with in subsection (b)(2).107
For attorney conduct in a court proceeding, the rule applied “the rules of the
jurisdiction in which the court sits.”108 For all attorney conduct outside of court
proceedings, the rule applied the ethical rules of the jurisdiction where the attorney was
licensed to practice if the attorney was admitted in just one jurisdiction.109 If an attorney
was licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction, the rule applied the ethical rules of
the jurisdiction where “the lawyer principally practices.”110 However, if “particular
conduct” of an attorney “clearly [had] its predominant effect in another jurisdiction in
which the lawyer [was] licensed to practice the [ethics] rules of that jurisdiction” applied
to such conduct.”111

107

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b) (1993).
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(1) (1993). This was “unless the rules of the court [provided]
otherwise.” Id. One commentator described this portion of the rule as applying the “substance/procedure
distinction” in making choice of law decisions “dealing with litigation conduct.” Geoffrey J. Ritts,
Professional Responsibility and the Conflict of Laws, 18 J. Legal Prof. 17, 87(1993).
109
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2)(i) (1993).
110
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2)(ii) (1993).
111
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2)(ii) (1993). One commentator has characterized this as a
“harmonization” approach to making choice of law decisions that weighs the interests of the various
jurisdictions and parties involved and attempts to accommodate those interests to the extent possible. Ritts,
supra note 108, at 85-86, 87. See also id. at 70 (stating that “‘[h]armonization’ appears to allow for
sensitive case-by-case analysis of conflicts problems in the ethics area–analysis that can be responsive to
the interests of states as coequal sovereigns in a federal system, and also to the needs of individual lawyers
who may have reasonable fear of being whipsawed between the inconsistent rules of the states”).
108

In its entirety, the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b) stated:
(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of
professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court before which a lawyer has been
admitted to practice (either generally or for the purposes of that proceeding), the rules to be
applied shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the rules of the court
provide otherwise; and
(2) for any other conduct,
(i) if the lawyer is licensed only in this jurisdiction, the rules to be applied shall
be the rules of this jurisdiction, and
(ii) if the lawyer is licensed to practice in this and another jurisdiction, the rules
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The rule did not define the terms “principally practices” or “predominant
effect.”112 Comment 4 to the rule did state that the “predominant effect” exception was
intended “to be a narrow one.”113 The comment went on to provide two examples of the
application of that language. The language would apply to the situation where an
attorney admitted and principally practicing in State A, but also admitted in State B,
“handled an acquisition by a company whose headquarters and operations were in State B
of another, similar such company.”114 However, the language would not apply “if the
lawyer handled an acquisition by a company whose headquarters and operations were in
State A of a company whose headquarters and main operations were in State A, but
which also had some operations in State B.”115 The comment did not address more
difficult scenarios.
Moreover, neither the language of this version of Rule 8.5 nor its comments dealt
explicitly with which state’s ethics law would apply when a jurisdiction was prosecuting
an attorney for conducting activity in a jurisdiction where the attorney was not admitted
to practice.116 Presumably, in such situations, the law of the jurisdiction where the
attorney was licensed to practice would apply, assuming he or she was licensed in only

to be applied shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer
principally practices; provided, however, that if particular conduct clearly has its
predominant effect in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the
rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to that conduct.
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b) (1993).
112
Daly, supra note 94, at 760 (“Although ‘principally practices’ and ‘predominant effect’ are the central
concepts in subsection (b)(2), Model Rule 8.5 fails inexplicably to define them.”).
113
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 4 (1993).
114
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 4 (1993).
115
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 4 (1993).
116
See Hazard, supra note 92, § 66.4, at 66-8 (stating that under the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)
“[o]utside of the litigation context, resolving the choice of professional responsibility rules is more
difficult”).
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one state.117 But this results seems counterintuitive when the attorney is being prosecuted
for conduct that occurred in a different state, especially if the conduct concerned is
prohibited in that state, but allowed in the licensing state.
Similarly, the rule was unclear as to what state’s ethics rules would apply to the
prelitigation conduct of an attorney. The rule applies the ethics rules of the applicable
court once a lawsuit is filed, but the rule is unclear as to whether that court’s ethics rules
apply to the attorney’s conduct in representing the same client regarding the subject
matter of the ultimate lawsuit prior to filing a complaint.118 Thus, the 1993 version of
Rule 8.5 determined the law applicable to an attorney’s conduct largely according to the
jurisdiction in which the attorney was admitted to practice law, but was fairly unclear
about what jurisdiction’s ethics laws applied to out of court conduct when an attorney
was licensed in more than one jurisdiction. Furthermore, the rule left something of a gap
as to what law applied to an attorney’s conduct prior to filing a lawsuit for a client.

117

See Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 178 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D. Mass.
2001) (stating that with regard to attorneys licensed by only one state, “the choice-of-law analysis is simply
that the lawyer is always subject to the ethical obligations of the state that licensed him, regardless of where
the conduct occurs”); Hazard, supra note 92, § 66.4, at 66-8 (stating that in a situation where an attorney is
licensed only in State A and is representing a “client based in State A” in “a transaction related to property
located in State B,” according to the 1993 version of Rule 8.5 “the lawyer is governed only by the rules of
State A”).
118
See Hazard, supra note 92, at 66-8 (stating that “Rule 8.5 does not directly address the issue of
prelitigation conduct such as advertising or solicitation”); Daly, supra note 94, at 759 (noting that
subsection (b)(1) of the 1993 version of Rule 8.5 “leaves unanswered the question [of] which jurisdiction’s
profession standards apply to the lawyer’s conduct prior to the lawyer’s admission” either generally or pro
hac vice only for the purposes of the specific lawsuit concerned). “Subsection (b)(1) also ignores the
possibility that a lawyer will undertake representation ‘in connection with a proceeding in a court’ without
have been admitted either generally or pro hac vice.” Id. at 760.
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C.

2002 Version of Model Rule 8.5

In August 2002, the ABA adopted amendments to the Model Rules recommended
by its Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice.119 Among the amendments adopted
were changes to Model Rule 8.5(b).120 The comments retain the stated purpose of
applying “one set of rules of professional conduct” to “any particular conduct of an
attorney.”121 The substance of subsection (b)(1), which originally dealt with conduct in
court, stayed the same, applying the ethics rules of the jurisdiction where the proceeding
concerned takes place, but its language was changed to apply to attorney conduct related
to matters “pending before a tribunal”122 in order to cover alternative dispute resolution
as well as court proceedings.123 Subsection (b)(2) dealing with “any other conduct” was
changed to apply “the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred, or,
if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that
jurisdiction.”124 Again, the text of the rule, as well as its comments, leaves important
language undefined, such as “conduct occurred” and “predominant effect.”
In an apparent attempt to help fill one of the gaps left by the 1993 version of the
rule, Comment 4 uses the “predominant effect” language of the rule to address the ethics

119

ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice Statement, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjphome.html (“On August 12, 2002, the American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted all nine
recommendations contained in the Commission’s Final Report.”).
120
The ABA also added language to Model Rule 8.5(a), governing disciplinary jurisdiction, that gives a
state explicit authority to discipline attorneys who provide legal services in that state without a license to
practice in that state. This new language provided: “A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also
subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal
services in this jurisdiction.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(a) (2002).
121
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 3 (2002).
122
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(1) (2002).
123
ABA Comm’n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Report with Recommendation to the
House of Delegates 277 (Aug. 2001) (“Recognizing the increasing use of alternative dispute-resolution
processes, the Commission has broadened a number of Rules that formerly applied to ‘courts’ to make
them apply to ‘tribunals,’ which include binding arbitration and other methods of formally adjudicating the
rights of parties.”).
124
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002).
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rules that apply to attorney conduct in representing a client before a lawsuit is filed or
alternative dispute resolution is used. The comment states that “[i]n the case of conduct
of a proceeding that is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such
conduct could be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in another
jurisdiction.”125
Furthermore, a safe harbor provision was added to subsection (b)(2) stating that a
“lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of
a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the
lawyer’s conduct will occur.”126 Comment 5 to the rule explains that this safe harbor
provision is to apply “[w]hen a lawyer’s conduct involves significant contacts with more
than one jurisdiction” and it is not “clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer’s
conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct occurred.”127

125

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 4 (2002).
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002). In its entirety, the text of the 2002 version of Model
Rule 8.5 states:

126

(a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to
the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the attorney’s conduct occurs. A
lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this
jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A
lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another
jurisdiction for the same conduct.
(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the
rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules
of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide
otherwise; and
(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s
conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different
jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall
not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction
in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct
will occur.
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 (2002).
127
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 5 (2002).

Copyright © 2006 by Michael W. Loudenslager

31
Therefore, under the current version of Model Rule 2002 in order generally to determine
the state ethics law to apply to an attorney representing a client in a jurisdiction where the
attorney is not admitted, the new Rule 8.5 looks to the state where “the lawyer’s conduct
occurred” or where the conduct’s “predominant effect” arises. However, due to the safe
harbor provision if it is unclear in which state the “predominant effect” of the attorney’s
conduct arose, the applicable law is that of any jurisdiction where the attorney can
plausibly argue he or she reasonably believed the predominant effect occurred.
The current language of the rule leaves it unclear as to which jurisdiction’s ethics
rules apply to electronic representations of clients. To start, it is not clear where an
attorney’s “conduct occurred” when he or she posts a reply in an Internet chat room, on
an Internet bulletin board or responds to client e-mails, for example, from a computer in
Ohio and the client receives these communications at a computer located in Virginia.
The attorney’s conduct could be construed to occur in the attorney’s home state, Ohio,
where he or she has an office because that is where the attorney is located when posting
in the chat room or on the bulletin board or drafting and then sending the e-mail.
Alternatively, the attorney’s conduct could be interpreted as occurring in the
client’s jurisdiction, Virginia in this example, because that is where the advice
presumably has an effect and where client acts on the advice. It further seems that if the
client acted upon the attorney’s advice in Virginia, Virginia would be where the
“predominant effect” of the attorney’s conduct occurred. However, under the safe harbor
provision in the rule if the attorney can argue that he or she “reasonably believed” that the
“predominant effect” of the electronic representation was in Ohio, Ohio’s ethics laws
would apply. Thus, due to the safe harbor, the current version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)
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may end up, at least in the context of an attorney’s electronic representation of a client
located in a different state, applying the ethics law of the state where the attorney is
licensed, the same result that would have occurred under the 1993 version of the rule.

IV.

CASE LAW AND ETHICS OPINIONS AIDING IN INTERPRETING
THE CURRENT LANGUAGE OF MODEL RULE 8.5(b)(2).

Only a handful of cases and ethical opinions have interpreted the “principally
practices” and “predominant effect” language from the 1993 version of Model Rule
8.5(b)(2)(ii).128 Nevertheless, these cases and opinions indicate that when the attorney
and client reside in different jurisdictions the “predominant effect” of an attorney’s
conduct can be viewed as occurring in either the jurisdiction where the attorney’s office
is located or the jurisdiction where the client resides depending on the facts involved.129

128

A few other cases have used choice of ethics law rules with almost identical language to the 1993
version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(i), which applies the ethics rules of the jurisdiction where the attorney is
licensed to practice law if the attorney is licensed in only one jurisdiction. See Philin Corp. v. Westhood,
Inc, No. CV-04-1228-HU, 2005 WL 582695, at *10 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2005) (finding alternatively under
Oregon choice of ethics law rule that because the attorney concerned was “apparently admitted only in
Oregon,” Oregon law applied to motion to disqualify); Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson &
Poole, P.A., 178 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D. Mass. 2001) (“All five jurisdictions follow Model Rule 8.5 with
respect to the treatment of lawyers licensed by only one state. For such lawyers, the choice-of-law analysis
is simply that the lawyer is always subject to the ethical obligations of the state that licensed him,
regardless of where the conduct occurs.”); O’Brien v. Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Group, 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 645,
2004 WL 304318, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004) (applying New York’s choice of ethics law rule and
holding that New York ethics rules applied to whether attorney was precluded ethically from prosecuting
constructive discharge case because it would require the attorney to divulge client secrets when attorney
was only licensed to practice law in New York during time concerned). A couple of cases also have used
choice of ethics law rules with almost identical language to the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(1)
which applies the ethical “rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits” to attorney conduct in court
proceedings. See Philin Corp, 2005 WL 582695, at **9-10 (applying ethics rules of the jurisdiction where
it sits, Oregon, to conduct of attorney in lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon when considering motion to disqualify the attorney as counsel for the plaintiff); In re Gonzalez, 773
A.2d 1026, 1029 (D.C. 2001) (holding that Virginia ethics law applied to conduct of attorney “in
connection with a proceeding in a Virginia court” in determining whether attorney should be disciplined
for revealing client secrets).
129
See infra notes 130–184 .
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In re Complaint as to Conduct of Summer dealt with whether Idaho or Oregon
ethics law applied to the conduct of an attorney licensed to practice in both states.130 An
attorney had been found guilty of attempting grand theft by deception under Idaho law
while representing a client pursuant to two separate automobile accidents.131 The client
had been involved in an automobile accident in Idaho a little less than two weeks prior to
an Oregon accident.132 In settling with the insurer of the other driver in the Idaho
accident, the attorney had represented that his client had not been injured in the
subsequent Oregon accident.133 Despite this, the attorney, one week after settling his
client’s claim for the Idaho accident, sent a demand letter to the claims adjuster for the
company whose driver was involved in the Oregon accident.134 In the letter, he stated
that his client did not suffer any symptoms until after the second accident, and he
attached some of the same medical records that he had submitted to the previous insurer
in settling the claim for the Idaho accident.135
The Supreme Court of Oregon first found that the attorney “principally
[practiced] law in Idaho.”136 After becoming a member of the bars in both Oregon and
Idaho, the attorney had “assumed a heavy caseload at a high volume personal injury law
firm in Nampa, Idaho.”137 However, the attorney’s firm maintained an office in Oregon
where the attorney occasionally worked.138 Moreover, in analyzing where the
predominant effect of the attorney’s conduct occurred with regard to the Oregon accident

130

105 P.3d 848, 849, 851 (Or. 2005).
105 P.3d at 850, 851.
132
105 P.3d at 850.
133
105 P.3d at 850.
134
105 P.3d at 850 & n.4
135
105 P.3d at 850.
136
105 P.3d at 851.
137
105 P.3d at 850.
138
105 P.3d at 850 n.3, 851.
131
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representation, the court noted that while the company whose driver was involved in that
accident was “principally an Idaho company, . . . its claims adjuster was located in
Oregon.”139 Furthermore, the claims adjuster had obtained information about the
accident from the attorney’s client in Oregon, and the claims adjuster in Oregon had been
the first to receive the demand letter from the attorney.140 “It follows, then, that the
effects of the [attorney’s] conduct were felt in both Oregon and Idaho. It could be argued
that the [attorney’s] acts had approximately equal impact in each jurisdiction.”141
This, presumably, would have called for application of Idaho law because the
court had already determined the attorney principally practiced in Idaho and the
“predominant effect” of his conduct was not “clearly” in Oregon, as required under the
1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) to apply the law of a jurisdiction other than the
one where the attorney “principally practices.” Furthermore, with the attorney’s primary
office being located in Idaho and the party who the attorney’s representations potentially
would have damaged potentially being located in Idaho, it seems that, of the two
jurisdictions concerned, the largest effect from the attorney’s conduct would be in Idaho.
However, the court noted that “the parties have litigated this proceeding as if the
[attorney’s] acts had their predominant effect in Oregon. Where that conclusion is at least
plausible, we will accept it and proceed accordingly by applying Oregon’s disciplinary
rules.”142

139

105 P.3d at 851.
105 P.3d at 851. After receiving the demand letter, the claims adjuster forwarded it to the company’s
principal office in Idaho. 105 P.3d at 850 n.4.
141
105 P.3d at 851.
142
105 P.3d at 851-52. Most likely whether the court applied Oregon or Idaho law would not have affected
the outcome of the action because defrauding a potential litigant most likely would subject the attorney to
discipline under the ethics laws of either jurisdiction. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1 (2003) (“In
the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly : (a) make a false statement of material
140
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In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Marks involved an attorney who was
licensed to practice law in both Wisconsin and Michigan.143 However, he maintained an
office only in Michigan and “75 percent of his practice [was] based in Michigan.”144 A
Wisconsin client retained the attorney to represent him in a personal injury action.145 The
client’s wife had been killed and his daughter and granddaughter were injured in a
Wisconsin automobile accident.146 The other driver involved in the accident was a
Michigan resident.147 The client terminated the attorney’s representation after about a
week.148 At this point, the attorney had already done substantial work on the case, but
had not commenced a lawsuit.149 The parties’ retainer agreement stated that the attorney
would be paid for legal services performed at an hourly rate plus expenses upon
termination of the representation prior to resolution of the case.150 Despite this language,
the attorney represented to two insurance companies that he maintained a lien in the
amount of twenty-five percent (25%) of any settlement of the former client’s claims.151
The client’s new attorney subsequently moved for a court order in Wisconsin state court
declaring that the client’s former attorney was not entitled to any legal fees beyond the
amount that he had originally invoiced the client and calculated at an hourly rate.152 The
former attorney then filed a lawsuit in Michigan state court against the former client, the

fact or law to a third person.”). The court noted that Idaho had also commenced disciplinary action against
the attorney. 105 P.3d at 851.
143
665 N.W.2d 836, 838 (Wis. 2003).
144
665 N.W.2d at 838.
145
665 N.W.2d at 838.
146
665 N.W.2d at 838.
147
665 N.W.2d at 838.
148
665 N.W.2d at 839.
149
665 N.W.2d at 839. The court noted that the attorney had “contacted the district attorney’s office and
the sheriff’s department, met with his clients, and began to prepare pleadings.” Id.
150
665 N.W.2d at 838-39.
151
665 N.W.2d at 840.
152
665 N.W.2d at 840. The attorney initially indicated that the amount due to him pursuant to the language
in the retainer agreement was a little over one thousand eight hundred dollars ($1,800). 665 N.W.2d at 839.
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new attorney and the insurance companies “asserting a ‘charging lien,’” among other
grounds.153
Once the two actions were settled, the former client and his subsequent attorney
filed a grievance in Wisconsin against the original attorney for representing to the
insurers that he had a twenty-five percent (25%) lien on the proceeds of the client’s
personal injury claims, for filing a complaint asserting breach of contract after the client
had terminated the representation, and filing an amended complaint alleging that his bill
had not been paid when the amount of the bill had already been tendered.154 The first
ground was brought under both the Wisconsin and Michigan attorney ethics rules while
the second and third grounds were brought only under the Michigan Rules of
Professional Conduct.155 The referee who initially heard the action dismissed all grounds
based wholly on Michigan ethics rules, leaving only the first ground based on Wisconsin
ethics rules.156
With regard to the first ground concerning the attorney’s representations that he
was entitled to twenty-five percent (25%) of the proceeds of the client’s claims, the
referee determined that the “predominant effect” of the attorney’s conduct “occurred in
Wisconsin because it affected the Koivistos, who are Wisconsin residents.”157 Therefore,
Wisconsin law applied to this ground.158 The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not
expressly review this determination by the referee noting only that “[n]either party
appears to dispute that the Wisconsin disciplinary rule was properly applied to this

153

665 N.W.2d at 840. The former attorney also alleged tortuous interference with a contract. Id.
665 N.W.2d at 842.
155
665 N.W.2d at 842.
156
665 N.W.2d at 842.
157
665 N.W.2d at 842.
158
665 N.W.2d at 842.
154
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count.”159 The referee’s analysis apparently would determine that the predominant effect
of an attorney’s conduct occurs in the jurisdiction where the client resides. Another
argument supporting the “predominant effect” occurring in Wisconsin, although not
mentioned in the opinion, would be that a Wisconsin accident would have been at issue in
any lawsuit filed on the client’s behalf. However, in determining where the
“predominant effect” of an attorney’s conduct occurred, the courts in both Marks and
Summer appear to have weighed heavily where the clients resided. This resulted in the
courts applying the ethics law from the client’s jurisdiction to the attorney’s conduct,
which incidentally also was the jurisdiction of the courts making the choice of law
determination.
Two New York ethics opinions have addressed to some extent the “principally
practices” and “predominant effect” language in New York Code of Professional
Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (“DR”) 1-105(B)(2)(b), which is almost identical to the
1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii).160 In the first opinion, an attorney’s law firm

159

665 N.W.2d at 842. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, did hold explicitly that the referee erred
in dismissing the second and third grounds alleging violations of the Michigan Rules of Professional
Conduct due to the attorney filing the lawsuit in Michigan. 665 N.W.2d at 845. Applying Wisconsin’s
choice of law rule, which is almost identical to the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b), the court held that
under subsection (b)(1) of that rule Michigan’s ethics rules applied to the attorney’s conduct in filing and
proceeding with the Michigan action because it was “conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court
before which a lawyer has been authorized to appear.” 665 N.W.2d at 846.
The court also found that under Wisconsin’s version of Model Rule 8.5(a), Wisconsin had
disciplinary jurisdiction such that the Wisconsin’s Office of Lawyer Regulation could proceed with a
complaint against an attorney licensed to practice in Wisconsin alleging violations of Michigan ethics rules
in a proceeding in Michigan state court. 665 N.W.2d at 846.
160
New York Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 1-105(B)(2) states that with regard to
which jurisdiction’s ethics rules should be applied to attorney conduct not in connection with a proceeding
in a court:
a. If the lawyer is licensed to practice only in this state, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of
this state, and
b. If the lawyer is licensed to practice in this state and another jurisdiction, the rules to be applied
shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally practices; provided,
however, that if particular conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another jurisdiction in
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had prepared immigration forms for a husband and wife and then submitted those forms
to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) office in New Jersey where the
clients lived.161 Included among the documents submitted was a form by which the firm
entered its appearance as the couple’s “attorney of record.”162 The husband and wife
subsequently became involved in litigation, and the attorney sought information on how
much of the wife’s file the law firm had to provide to the husband after he requested her
complete file.163
In a footnote, the ethics committee of the New York City Bar Association dealt
with what jurisdiction’s law applied to this issue.164 The committee first noted that the
attorney’s letterhead indicated that “the attorney’s firm maintained its practice of law in
the State of New York.”165 Moreover, the committee emphasized that “all services
rendered by the firm in this engagement were performed in or from New York,” although
it recognized that the firm submitted the clients’ INS documents to the New Jersey
immigration office.166 The committee concluded that the New York Code of Professional
Responsibility governed the law firm’s “professional activities” because New York was
the “state in which the firm maintains its practice and in which we assume the attorney
and any others in the firm who worked on the engagement are admitted to practice.”167
The committee presumably could have left the analysis there using New York’s DR 1-

which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to that
conduct.
N.Y. Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 5-101(B)(2) (2003) (effective June 30, 1999).
161
N.Y. City Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1999-07.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
N.Y. City Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1999-07 n.1.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
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105(B)(2)(a), which is almost identical to the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(i),
dealing with the choice of ethics law when an attorney is licensed in only one
jurisdiction. Assuming that the attorneys that worked on the couple’s INS forms were
only licensed to practice in New York, this provision would call for the application of
New York’s ethics rules.168
However, possibly due to the lack of information on whether any of the attorneys
concerned were also licensed to practice in New Jersey and the fact that the firm
submitted the INS forms in New Jersey, the committee went on to address the language
in DR 1-105(B)(2)(b), which is almost identical to the 1993 version of Model Rule
8.5(b)(2)(ii), dealing with the applicable jurisdiction’s ethics rules to use when an
attorney is licensed in two states. The committee stated that “[u]nder DR 1-105(B)(2),
because the lawyer principally practices in New York, the New York rules would apply
to his conduct in this instance.”169 The committee, though, did not go on to address
whether or not the attorneys’ “conduct cleary [had] its predominant effect in another
jurisdiction,”170 in this situation New Jersey. Thus, the committee appears to have
stopped its analysis halfway through the applicable choice of law provision.
Arguably the law firm’s conduct clearly had its predominant effect in New Jersey
where both clients lived and where the firm had filed INS documents on the clients’
behalf and entered an official appearance as the clients’ attorneys. Alternatively,
although not mentioning the “predominant effect” language, the opinion could be
interpreted as implicitly determining that the “predominant effect” of the attorneys’

168

See N.Y. Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 5-101(B)(2)(a) (stating that “[i]f the lawyer is licensed to
practice only in this state, the rule to be applied shall be the rules of this state”).
169
Id.
170
N.Y. Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 5-101(B)(2)(b) (2003).
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conduct was in New York where the firm was located and where the attorneys prepared
the legal documents involved in the INS representation. This was also the jurisdiction
where the client file concerned was located. Under this view, the clients’ residence and
the jurisdiction where the law firm submitted the documents would be of little
consequence. While perhaps constituting a misreading of the “predominant effect”
language in the choice of law rule, this interpretation is at least consistent with an
application of the entire test set out in New York’s DR 1-105(B)(2)(b).
In a second New York ethics opinion, an immigration law attorney licensed to
practice in both New York and Illinois, but who practiced in Chicago, raised a conflict of
interest issue concerning one former and one current client.171 After quoting New York’s
DR 1-105(B)(2),172 the ethics committee of the New York State Bar Association
concluded that Illinois ethics rules applied to the attorney’s conduct because “the
jurisdiction in which the attorney principally practices [was] Illinois.”173 Perhaps more
interestingly, the committee went on to state that even if the attorney had principally
practiced in New York, the Illinois ethics rules would apply because the “particular
conduct in the inquiry [had] its predominant effect in Illinois.”174 The opinion did not
state explicitly what the specific “conduct in the inquiry” was, except for earlier noting
that the attorney represented “individuals in immigration matters.”175 Assuming that the
attorney’s conduct at issue dealt with an immigration representation in Illinois, the
opinion can be interpreted as concluding that the “predominant effect” of such a

171

N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 750 (2001).
The committee also noted that New York’s DR 1-105 is based on Model Rule 8.5. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 750 n.1.
173
N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 750.
174
Id.
175
Id.
172
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representation clearly would occur in Illinois, even if the attorney’s office was in New
York. This is a more accurate interpretation of this language than in the prior ethics
opinion from the New York City Bar Association committee, and the opinion evidences a
complete application of the test set out in DR 1-105(B)(2)(b), dealing with attorneys
licensed in two states.176
As evidenced by the cases and ethics opinions dealing with the terms
“predominant effect” in the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii), a more deliberate
and explicit application by courts and ethics committees of the test presented both in the
1993 and current version of the model choice of ethics law rule is necessary to bring
more predictability to this area. However, the available authority illustrates some
significant factors in determining where the “predominant effect” of an attorney’s
conduct occurs. While the courts in Summers and Marks ultimately acquiesced to the
wishes of the parties and applied the law of the jurisdiction where the court sat,177 in both
cases, this was the jurisdiction where the clients apparently lived and where the
underlying accident occurred that was the reason for the attorney’s representation.178 So,
the client’s residence and the location of underlying events causing the need for legal
representation undoubtedly are important factors to consider in the “predominant effect”
determination. Additionally, the opinion of the New York State Bar Association ethics
176

Two other recent New York ethics opinions note the possible existence of a choice of ethics law issue
with regard to a particular attorney’s conduct without specifically resolving the issue. See N.Y. State Bar
Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 768 (2003) (noting that “in the context of a federal government agency
in which a lawyer may be rendering services beyond or outside the boundaries of this State, then the choice
of law provisions of DR 1-105 may apply” but assuming “[f]or the purposes of this opinion” that “the New
York Code of Professional Responsibility governs the conduct in question”); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm.
on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 742 (2001) (noting with regard to attorney licensed to practice in New York but
employed overseas that “[w]hether the rules of professional conduct that would be applied are those of
New York or some other jurisdiction depends on whether the lawyer is also admitted in another jurisdiction
and, if so, the place where the lawyer ‘principally practices’ or where the lawyer’s conduct has its
‘predominant effect’” and then applying New York ethics law to the attorney’s conduct without analysis).
177
In re Summers, 105 P.3d at 851-52; In re Marks, 665 N.W.2d at 842.
178
In re Summers, 105 P.3d at 850; In re Marks, 665 N.W.2d at 838.
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committee apparently placed importance on the location of the court or agency office
before which the attorney represented the client.179 So, this also is a potentially
significant factor.180
Nevertheless, the ethics opinion from the New York City Bar ethics committee
would give an attorney grounds for arguing that where the attorney conducted the actual
legal work, in other words physically drafted documents and conducted research
concerned in the representation, is a factor in the “predominant effect” analysis.181
Furthermore, the Summers case also considered the location of an opposing party and
where an opposing party’s claims adjuster collected information regarding the accident
underlying the potential litigation.182
The New York City ethics committee’s interpretation of the “predominant” effect
language, as well as the additional factors considered in Summer, are potentially
problematic especially considering the safe harbor language included in the 2002 version
of Model Rule 8.5(b). The safe harbor language states that an attorney will not be subject
to discipline if his or her conduct “conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the
lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur.”183
Given the current sparseness of authority on where the “predominant effect” of an
attorney’s conduct occurs, the opinion of the New York City ethics committee and
Summers provide an attorney with grounds to argue that he or she reasonably believed
179

N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 750 (stating that even if an immigration law attorney
had principally practiced in New York the “particular conduct in the inquiry [had] its predominant effect in
Illinois); supra notes 174–176 and accompanying text (analyzing this part of the ethics opinion).
180
Obviously, this factor would be less helpful, if not completely irrelevant, if a transactional representation
was involved.
181
See supra notes 166, 169–170 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the conclusion by
the New York City Bar’s ethics committee that New York ethics law applied to a New York City law
firm’s representation of a New Jersey couple in an immigration matter).
182
105 P.3d at 851.
183
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002).
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that the “predominant effect” of any representation involving multiple jurisdictions
occurred in his or her home jurisdiction where the attorney’s office is physically located
and where he or she actually drafted documents, conducted research or investigated the
legal matter concerned. This argument might especially be persuasive when an electronic
representation is involved and the attorney never leaves his or her office in representing
the client, despite the fact that the client that feels the consequences of the representation
is located in a different jurisdiction and that where the attorney drafted documents or
conducted legal research has little to no relevance to where the effect of the
representation is felt. As explained below, this outcome likely invalidates the current
version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) under dormant commerce clause principles when applied
to attorney Internet representations.184

V.

THE DORMANT ASPECT OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The dormant commerce clause is an implicit facet of the Commerce Clause

in the United States Constitution.185 Because the Commerce Clause gives the United
States Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states,186 state governments,
under the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause, cannot inhibit or frustrate trade
between states through legislation, even in the absence of Congressional legislation.187

184

See infra Section VII. C.
Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 193.
186
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes.”).
187
Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 193, 208. The Commerce Clause arose from the recognized need for the
national government to have the ability to promote trade between the states after the nation’s experience
with the Articles of Confederation when states erected internal trade barriers through taxes and duties. See
Granholm v. Head, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1895 (2005) (stating that the dormant commerce clause “‘reflect[s] a
central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the
conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles
185
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This power to promote trade between the states, however, is balanced against the
federalist system of government created in the Constitution where states and their citizens
retained powers not expressly given to the federal government.188 For example, states
possess “police powers” allowing them to “regulate activities affecting the health, safety,
security and general welfare of their residents.”189 Assuming a state is not attempting to
further an improper purpose,190 the basic question in a dormant commerce clause analysis
is whether state legislation inhibits interstate commerce to such an extent that the state’s
interest should give way to the national interest in promoting trade between the states.191

of Confederation.’”) (alteration original)(quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979));
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (“Under the Articles of Confederation, state taxes
and duties hindered and suppressed interstate commerce; the Framers intended the Commerce Clause as a
cure for these structural ills.”); Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 208 (“The Commerce Clause was written in
order to avoid the ‘Balkanization’ of the United States economy that resulted after the institution of Articles
of Confederation.”).
188
See U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited to it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
189
Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 209. See also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (“As long as a
State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to ‘place itself in a position of economic
isolation,’ it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the
integrity of its natural resources.”) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)); H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949) (recognizing “the broad power in the State to
protect its inhabitants against the perils to health or safety, fraudulent traders and highway hazards even by
use of measures which bear adversely upon interstate commerce”); Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More
Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Propose Unitary Framework, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 395,
418 n.102 (1998) (“The Court has long recognized the idea that states have an inherent ‘police power’ that
allows them to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.”).
190
Courts have recognized the intent to discriminate against interstate commerce as an improper purpose of
state legislation under the dormant commerce clause. See Granholm v. Head, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1895 (2005)
(“States may not enact laws that burden out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give a competitive
advantage to in-state busineses.”); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 579 (1986) (“When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or
when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck
down the statute without further inquiry.”); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)
(“Neither the power to tax nor the police power may be used by the state of destination with the aim and
effect of establishing an economic barrier against competition with the products of another state or the
labor its residents.”). If a court can infer that the state had such an intent in enacting legislation, this
constitutes a “per se” violation of the dormant commerce clause. Lawrence, supra note 189, at 426;
Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 214.
191
Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws 145 (2d ed. 1995) (“[T]he commerce clause has caused courts to
balance the forum’s concededly legitimate interest against the needs of the interstate commercial system”
and “compares an existing local interest to the interests of other states.”); Lawrence, supra note 189, at 410
(“[T]he resolution of a particular case today will turn in large part on a consideration of the local (state)
interests in regulating local affairs as it relates to the national interest in promoting interstate commerce.”).
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Therefore, the United States Supreme Court under its modern dormant commerce
clause test balances the benefits of the state regulation against the burden that such
regulation places on interstate commerce.192 The test from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
states that even-handed or non-discriminatory regulations that promote “a legitimate local
public interest . . . will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”193 Additionally, the Court has
invalidated “state regulations that have the effect, intended or not, of regulating
commerce that occurs ‘wholly outside of the State’s borders’ as per se violations of the
Commerce Clause.”194 Finally, at times when analyzing state statutes under dormant
commerce clause principles, the Supreme Court has examined whether the statute
“adversely affects interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent
regulations.”195 However, a close reading of the cases dealing with state regulation of the
nation’s highway and railroad systems, the major context in which the Court has
examined this concern, indicates that the Court still has used a Pike balancing analysis in
these situations.196
Brilmayer states that the Constitution’s “prohibition on overreaching essentially compels a state not to treat
[a] person, business, or dispute as local when the state would prefer to do just that.” Lea Brilmayer, supra,
at 134. The Constitution prohibits such state overreaching because “a state may find it is in its interest to
apply its law, or employ its judicial authority, in situations where it has no legitimate concern.” Id.
192
Loudenslager, supra note , at 213-214 (explaining the Supreme Court’s modern dormant commerce
clause test). “[T]he intrusive7 conduct that [the dormant commerce clause] prohibits is conduct that is too
costly in its impact on out-of-state activity considering the limited domestic benefits it seeks to achieve.”
Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 137.
193
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). “The commerce clause is violated when the state
has a legitimate reason for regulating, but in doing so it imposes severe burdens on conduct in other states.”
Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 136.
194
Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 215 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982)
(plurality opinion)). For a more extensive discussion of Supreme Court cases using this test, see generally
Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 215-19.
195
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88-89 (1987).
196
Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 219-20. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441
(1978) (“Our recent decisions make clear that the inquiry necessarily involves a sensitive consideration of
the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the
course of interstate commerce.”); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945) (“[T]he matters for
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Several commentators have recognized the relevance of the dormant commerce
clause principles to conflicts of law analysis.197 Both conflicts of law and dormant
commerce clause principles compare competing state interests and analyze when the
application of a jurisdiction’s substantive law is appropriate,198 and both ultimately are
concerned with how the various sovereign states in the American federalist structure of
government relate to one another, especially with regard to facilitating commerce
between states.199 Thus, it is natural to examine the limits that the dormant Commerce
Clause puts on the choice of law decisions of states.

ultimate determination here are the nature and extent of the burden which the state regulation of interstate
trains, adopted as a safety measure, imposes on interstate commerce and . . . the relative weights of the state
and national interests involved.”). For an extensive discussion of the Supreme Court’s “transportation
cases,” see Loudenslager, supra note7 , at 219-226.
197
See Brilmayer, supra note191 , at 136-37, 144-48, 158-59 (discussing the limitations that the Commerce
Clause puts on the application of state substantive law to interstate activity); Louise Weinberg, Choosing
Law: The Limitations Debates, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 683, 690, 713-715 (discussing dormant commerce
clause cases “bearing on extraterritorial applications of forum law when the forum may have only a
‘fractional interest’ in applying its law”); P. John Kozyris, Some Observations on State Regulation of
Multistate Takeovers—Controlling Choice of Law Through the Commerce Clause, 14 Del. J. Corp. L. 499,
505 (1989) (discussing under dormant commerce clause principles “the extent to which states other than the
state of incorporation may apply their laws to the transfer of control of multistate corporations which have
some local contacts” and “the scope of state authority to regulate multistate transactions in securities”);
Harold W. Horowitz, Comment, The Commerce Clause as Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 806, 824 (1971) (discussing how the “[r]ecognition of the commerce clause as a limitation on
state choice-of-law doctrine” serves “the federal interest in promoting uniform and unburdensome patterns
of regulation”).
198
See Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 147 (stating that the dormant commerce clause analysis identifies the
forum’s interests and “explicitly considers the interest of the other states as well and forms a comparative
judgment” in determining “how much of the statute’s effect is legitimate and how much of it cannot be
justified by a legitimate forum interest.”).
199
See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 6 cmt. e (1971) (“Probably the most important function
of choice of law rules is to make the interstate and international systems work well. Choice-of-law rules,
among other things, should seek to further harmonious relations between states and to facilitate commercial
intercourse between them.”).
Professor Brilmayer states that “perhaps the most obvious benefits” of states joining with other
states in a federal government “are the increased commercial prospects integration offers.” Brilmayer,
supra note 191, at 131. “One purpose of federalism was to establish a ‘common market’ nationwide, in
which the products in one state would not be discriminated against in others.” Id. “When one thinks of
protection from discrimination against the business interests of other states, the constitutional provision that
immediately comes to mind is the commerce clause.” Id. at 132. See also supra note 187, and authorities
cited therein (discussing the purpose of the Commerce Clause to promote trade between states and prevent
states from erecting internal trade barriers). “Whether the subject is people, business, or legal decisions, it
is clear that one of the primary themes in constitutional law of interstate relations is achieving the benefits
of mutual cooperation on the basis of state lines.” Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 132.
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However, while the various conflicts of law regimes seek to decide which single
jurisdiction’s law is most appropriate to apply to the activities of a particular actor,
dormant commerce clause principles seek to determine only whether the application of a
state’s law fails to meet the minimum thresholds required under the Constitution.200
Therefore, under the dormant commerce clause, at least in theory, it is possible that the
application of several states’ laws may be appropriate.201 The dormant commerce clause
analysis then would allow a conflicts of law regime to determine which particular
jurisdiction’s law, out of those that pass Constitutional muster, most appropriately should
control the rights of parties in specific circumstances.
VI. APPLICATION OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE TO STATE
REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
A. Case Law Applying Dormant Commerce Clause to State Regulation of
Internet Activity
Cases analyzing state regulation of Internet activity under the dormant commerce
clause mainly have dealt with two different types of state statutes. The first type of
statute criminalizes knowingly posting material on the Internet that would be “harmful to
minors.”202 These statutes often can be construed to hold the operator of a Web site

200

See Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 164 (stating that one of the manners in which constitutional
determinations are different from traditional conflicts state choice of law determinations is that
constitutional determinations “impose a minimal threshold rather than singling out one state’s law as the
best.”); Horowitz, supra note 197, at 824 (describing “the commerce clause as a limitation on state choiceof-law doctrine”). The federal constitutional standard “is a minimal rather than an ideal test.” Brilmayer,
supra note 191, at 165.
201
See Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 165 (“[C]urrent constitutional doctrine asks only whether a state might
reasonably find that it has interest or that application of its law is fair. A state need not have a greater
interest than other states, . . . It need only make a decision that falls within reasonable limits.”). Thus, it is
possible in any given circumstance that more than one state might reasonably have an interest in regulating
an activity.
202
See, e.g., PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2004) (invalidating under the dormant
commerce clause a Virginia statute making it unlawful to “knowingly display for commercial purposes in a
manner whereby juveniles may examine or peruse” images or an “electronic file or message containing an
image” or an “electronic file or message containing words or sound recording” depicting or describing
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criminally liable simply for making such material available on a Web site whether or not
the operator was aware of specific instances when minors accessed such material.203
Courts overwhelmingly have held that such statutes violate the dormant Commerce
Clause.204 The second type of statute criminalizes the use of the Internet to intentionally
“lure,” “seduce” or “solicit” minors into engaging in sexual activity with an adult.205
“sexually explicit nudity or sexual conduct” that “is harmful to juveniles”); Am. Bookseller Found. v.
Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause
Vermont statute prohibiting the use of the Internet to distribute to minors sexually explicit materials
“harmful to minors”); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that statute
prohibiting dissemination of materials harmful to minors by computer was unconstitutional under the
dormant commerce clause); Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(invalidating under the dormant commerce clause a New York statute making it a felony to “intentionally []
use any computer communication system” to communicate to a minor material of a sexual nature “which is
harmful to minors”) (alteration in original). One commentator has termed these laws “dissemination
statutes.” Chin Pann, iBrief, The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Regulation of the Internet: Are
Laws Protecting Minors from Sexual Predators Constitutionally Different Than Those Protecting Minors
from Sexually Explicit Materials?, 2005 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 8, ¶ 1,
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2005DLTR0008.pdf.
In defining “harmful to minors,” these statutes often rely on the United States Supreme Court’s
First Amendment obscenity test and require that the material: (1) predominantly appeals to the prurient
interest of minors, (2) be patently offensive to the prevailing standards of the adult community, and (3) lack
serious artistic, political and scientific value. See, e.g., PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 231 (describing Virginia
statute’s definition of “harmful to juveniles”); Am. Booksellers Found, 342 F.3d at 100 n.1 (setting out
Vermont statutes “[h]armful to minors” definition); Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 163 (describing
New York statute’s definition of “harmful to minors”).
203
See PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 235 (explaining that publishers on the Web generally make their material
“publicly available to users around the world, regardless of age, and lack any practical or reliable means for
preventing minors from gaining access to the information on their sites or for verifying the true age of users
of their Web sites”) (quoting district court opinion); Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 100 (stating that
the terms of the Vermont statute at issue “can be easily read to apply to material placed on a website or
shared with an e-mail or internet discussion group”); Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 168 (stating that
under the New York statute at issue a web site operator might be subject to “regulation by states that the
actor never intended to reach and possibly was unaware were being accessed” and was not limited to
“person-to-person” communications). See also Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 254 (explaining that by
interpreting broadly the New York statute at issue in Am. Libraries Ass’n, it “could reach a person or entity
that simply intended to post or communicate the material considered ‘harmful to minors’ and did not intend
for such material to reach a minor”).
204
See infra notes 209–217 and accompanying text (explaining main grounds courts have used to invalidate
statutes criminalizing posting of material harmful to minors on the Internet).
205
See, e.g., Hatch v. Super. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (examining California
statute making it a felony for a person to use the Internet to distribute “any harmful matter to a minor”
knowing that a minor is receiving the matter with the intent of arousing or appealing to the “passions or
sexual desires of that person or of a minor” and with the purpose or intent of seducing a minor); Cashatt v.
State, 873 So. 2d 430, 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (analyzing Florida statute making it a felony for a
person to “knowingly” use the Internet “to seduce, solicit, lure, or entice,” or to attempt any of these with,
“a child or another person believed by the person to be a child, to commit any act . . . relating to sexual
battery; . . . lewdness and indecent exposure;” or “child abuse”); People v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 127
(N.Y. 2000) (scrutinizing New York statute prohibiting “disseminating indecent material to minors” in
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These cases often involve an adult initially communicating with a police officer posing as
a minor in an Internet chat room or bulletin board and engaging in sexually explicit
discussions with the supposed minor.206 Often the adult attempts to meet the intended
minor victim in person for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity.207 Courts

order “to importune[], invite[] or induce[] a minor to engage in” sexual activity); State v. Snyder, 2003Ohio-6399, ¶ 7, 801 N.E.2d 876, 880-81 (Ohio Ct. App.) (examining Ohio statute prohibiting use of the
Internet to “solicit” another person “to engage in sexual activity” when the solicitor is an adult and
“believes that the other person is thirteen years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age”).
Although not nearly as prevalent as the two contexts mentioned in the text, a few courts have also
dealt with whether state regulation of e-mail violates the dormant commerce clause. See Ferguson v.
Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 260, 264-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a California
statute regulating “conduct by persons or entities doing business in California who transmit unsolicited
advertising materials” through electronic mail and fax machines was valid under the dormant commerce
clause); MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., Cv. No. 248514, 2004 WL 3141311, at *6 (Md. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 3, 2004) (holding Maryland statute regulating electronic mail was invalid under the dormant
commerce clause because it did not “provide the email must be received in Maryland, instead the statute
pertains to situations where an email sender in one states [sic] sends an email to a Maryland resident living
or working in another state” and therefore the statute sought “to regulate the transmission of commercial
email between persons in states outside of Maryland, even when the email never enters Maryland”); State
v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 407, 409-13 (Wash. 2001) (upholding under the dormant commerce clause a
Washington statute that prohibited “sending a commercial e-mail message from a computer located in
Washington or to an e-mail address held by a Washington resident” that misrepresented or disguised “the
message’s point of origin or transmission path or [used] a misleading subject line”). Another court also has
held that the application of a state’s motor vehicle code to a car manufacturer’s use of a Web site to sell
cars in that state did not violate the dormant commerce clause. Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp.,
264 F.3d 493, 505 (5th Cir. 2001).
206
See, e.g., Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460-61 (setting out the Internet communications between the
defendant and a woman posing as two different thirteen year-old girls); Cashatt, 873 So. 2d at 433
(providing details concerning defendant’s Internet communications with a police officer posing as a
fourteen year-old boy “by means of a ‘bulletin board’ posting and ensuing e-mail messages”); State v.
Backlund, 2003 ND 184, ¶ 2, 672 N.W.2d 431, 433 (describing Internet chat room communications
between defendant and a police officer posing as a fourteen year-old girl); State v. Bolden, 2004-Ohio2315, ¶¶ 5-6, 2004 WL 1043317 at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.) (summarizing communications between defendant
and a police officer posing as a fifteen year-old girl in an Internet chat room).
One commentator has described the crimes that these statutes proscribe as “‘Internet luring’ or
‘enticement.’” Julie Sorenson Stanger, Comment, Salvaging States’ Rights to Protect Children from
Internet Predation: State Power to Regulate Internet Activity Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 2005
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 191, 192. See also Pann, supra note202 , at ¶ 1 (describing such laws as “luring statutes”).
“Such a crime is patterned after the traditional crimes of solicitation and attempt but specifically addresses
the sexual solicitation of a minor over the Internet.” Stanger, supra, at 192.
207
See, e.g., Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462 (defendant met with woman posing as thirteen year-old at a
hotel pool); Cashatt, 873 So. 2d at 433 (defendant arranged to meet with supposed boy and “showed up at
the meeting place at the time agreed upon”); Backlund, 2003 ND 184, ¶ 2, 672 N.W.2d at 433 (defendant
arranged to meet with police officer posing as a fourteen year-old girl at a convenience store where the
defendant ultimately was arrested); Snyder, 2003-Ohio-6399, ¶ 4, 801 N.E.2d at 880 (defendant and police
officer posing as a fourteen year-old girl arranged to meet at a restaurant where defendant was arrested).
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overwhelming have held that these statutes do not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause.208
In dealing with the first category of statutes that hold Web site operators liable for
making harmful material available to minors on the Internet, courts have used three main
grounds to invalidate such statutes under the Commerce Clause. First, courts have
asserted that such statutes project a state’s legislative regime outside of the state by
affecting operators of Web sites who are physically located outside of the state and who
may or may not have people from within the state visit their Web site.209 Therefore, the
legislation affects commerce that occurs outside of the state or, in other words, operates
extraterritorially. The site operator must comply with another state’s statute to avoid
criminal prosecution despite being physically located in a different state whether or not
residents of the other state actually visit the site.210 Second, using the Pike balancing test,

208

See infra notes 222–231 and accompanying text (explaining analysis of courts holding that statutes
preventing use of Internet to seduce or lure minors into engaging in sexual activity do not violate the
dormant Commerce Clause).
Some commentators have noted that the opinions invalidating statutes criminalizing the posting of
material harmful to minors on the Internet largely have come from federal courts while the cases holding
constitutional the statutes prohibiting the use of the Internet to lure minors into sexual activity with an adult
are from state courts. Pann, supra note 202, at ¶¶ 2-3 (explaining that this likely has occurred because “a
multitude of interested parties seeking to protect their speech” initiated the cases dealing with
“dissemination statutes” in federal court as “preemptive requests for injunctions” while state authorities
brought the criminal charges against the defendants who challenged the “luring statutes”); Stanger, supra
note 206, at 203, 211 (noting that “[a]lthough federal courts have not yet reviewed the validity of state
Internet luring statutes, they have struck down other statutes intended to protect minors from sexually
explicit and harmful Internet materials” while “state courts have consistently . . . upheld state police power
to regulate Internet activity harmful to minors”).
209
PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 240 (“Given the broad reach of the Internet, it is difficult to see how a blanket
regulation of Internet material, such as [the Virginia statute at issue], can be construed to have only a local
effect.”); Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 104 (“In practical effect, Vermont [through the statute at
issue] ‘has ‘projected its legislation’ into other States, and directly regulated commerce therein,’ in
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.”) (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 584 (1986)); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding
that the New Mexico statute at issue “represents an attempt to regulate interstate conduct occurring outside
New Mexico’s border, and is accordingly a per se violation of the Commerce Clause”); Am. Libraries
Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 177 (“New York has deliberately imposed its legislation on the Internet and, by
doing so, projected its law into other states whose citizens use the Net.”) (citations omitted).
210
See Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 177 (“The nature of the Internet makes it impossible to restrict
the effects of the New York act to conduct occurring within New York . . . [C]onduct that may be legal in
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courts have found that the burden placed on interstate commerce by such legislation
outweighs its putative benefits.211 These cases, although recognizing that states have a
legitimate interest in protecting minors from harm,212 have minimized the benefits of
such a statute due to jurisdictional restraints that prevent a state from prosecuting
operators of Web sites who physically are located outside of the state.213

the state in which the user acts can subject the user to prosecution in New York and thus subordinate the
user’s home state’s policy . . . to New York’s local concerns.”). The Second Circuit described the effect of
such legislation in the following manner:
A person outside Vermont who posts information on a website or on an electronic discussion
group cannot prevent people in Vermont from accessing the material. If someone in Connecticut
posts material for the intended benefit of other people in Connecticut, that person must assume
that someone from Vermont may also view the material. This means that those outside Vermont
must comply with [the Vermont statute] or risk prosecution by Vermont. Vermont has
“project[ed]” [its statute] onto the rest of the nation.
Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 103.
211
PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 240 (holding that the Virginia statute at issue “fails under the Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis of Pike v. Bruce Church”); ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1161 (“[U]nder the balancing
test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc, the burdens on interstate commerce imposed by [the New Mexico statute
at issue] exceed any local benefits conferred by the statute.”); Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 181
(“The severe burden on interstate commerce resulting from the New York statute is not justifiable in light
of the attenuated local benefits arising from it.”).
212
PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 240 (“There is no question that Virginia has a compelling interest in protecting
the physical and psychological well-being of minors.”); ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1161 (“We agree that the
protection of minors from [harmful] materials is an undeniably compelling governmental interest.”); Am.
Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 177 (“[T]he protection of children against pedophilia is a quintessentially
legitimate state objective.”).
213
PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 240 (noting that if the Virginia statue only reached intrastate communication,
“it will have no local benefit given the vast number of other communication options available to a juvenile
seeking them”); ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1162 (noting the “practical difficulties” of New Mexico prosecuting
parties for violating the statute concerned “but whose only contact with [New Mexico] occurs via the
Internet”) (alteration original) (quoting Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 178); Cyberspace Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 751 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (“[T]he [Michigan] Act will be wholly
ineffective in achieving the asserted goal because nearly half of all Internet communications originate
overseas.”), aff’d, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000); Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 178 (“The local
benefits likely to result from the New York Act are not overwhelming. The Act can have no effect on
communications originating outside of the United States. . . . Further, in the present case, New York’s
prosecution of parties from out of state who have allegedly violated the Act, but whose only contact with
New York occurs via the Internet, is beset with practical difficulties, even if New York is able to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over such parties.”).
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Third, some courts have gone beyond analysis of the particular statute at hand and
asserted more broadly that only the federal government may regulate the Internet under
dormant commerce clause principles.214 Courts generally have made this argument in the
following manner. The interstate nature of the Internet necessitates consistent treatment
of Internet activity,215 and thus, to avoid inconsistent state regulatory regimes from
“[paralyzing] the development of the Internet altogether” only federal Internet regulation
is appropriate.216 Because Web site operators cannot cut off access to their sites from
particular states, allowing states to regulate the Internet would require a Web site operator
to comply with the most stringent state regulation that existed, which would inevitably
stunt the growth of some types of commercial activity on the Internet.217
214

Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 104 (“We think it likely that the internet will soon be seen as
falling within the class of subjects that are protected from State regulation because they ‘imperatively
demand[] a single uniform rule.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299,
319 (1851)); ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1162 (“[C]ertain types of commerce have been recognized as requiring
national regulation. The Internet is surely such a medium.”) (citations omitted); Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969
F. Supp. at 181 (“The courts have long recognized that certain types of commerce demand consistent
treatment and are therefore susceptible to regulation only on a national level. The Internet represents one
of those areas; effective regulation will require national, and more likely global cooperation.”).
Some courts have described this effectively as a preemption argument. Hatch v. Sup. Ct., 94 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 453, 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“Pataki’s [argument] . . . is sort of a preemption argument: that
logging on the Internet automatically places one beyond the reach of state criminal prosecution.”); People
v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (describing this analysis as “essentially a preemption
analysis”).
215
Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that the Internet “requires
a cohesive national scheme of regulation so that users are reasonably able to determine their obligations”).
See also Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 103 (“Because the internet does not recognize geographic
boundaries, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a state to regulate internet activities without ‘project[ing] its
legislation in to other States.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 334
(1989)).
216
Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). See also Cyberspace
Commc’ns, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (“The [Michigan] Act, and other statutes like it, would subject the
Internet to inconsistent regulations across the nation. Information is a commodity and must flow freely.”).
217
Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 183. See also Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 103 (“Although
Vermont aims to protect only Vermont minors, the rest of the nation is forced to comply with its regulation
or risk prosecution.”); Cyberspace Commc’ns, Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 751 (“A New York speaker must
comply with the Act in order to avoid the risk of prosecution in Michigan even though (s)he does not intend
his [or her] message to be read in Michigan.”). This part of the third ground for invalidating statutes
criminalizing the mere posting of material on the Internet appears to “double dip” because it uses the
supposed extraterritorial reach of state regulation to argue for national regulation of the Internet. Therefore,
this actually is not a separate ground, as stated by these courts, but just a continuation of the argument for
the first ground.
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However, the cases that have made this sweeping argument ignore that the
Supreme Court has still used the Pike balancing test in the major context in which the
Court has mentioned the consistency of state regulation as a concern, the cases dealing
with regulation of the United States’ highway and railway systems.218 Therefore, in the
instances when the Court ultimately determined that state regulations of highway and
railways were unconstitutional, this resulted from the burden created by compliance with
the different regulations of several states outweighing the benefit derived by the states
concerned from regulating the activity at issue.219 Cases setting out this argument also
ignore that on Web sites that are more interactive, the site operator will have
opportunities to learn the physical location of the site user.220
Courts have held that the second category of statutes prohibiting adults from using
the Internet to lure, seduce or solicit minors into engaging in sexual activity do not
operate extraterritorially or overburden commerce.221 First, these courts have reasoned
that these “luring” statutes regulate conduct that, at least partially, occurs within the
prosecuting state.222 Generally, a defendant must commit at least part of a crime in a
state in order to be subject to a state’s criminal jurisdiction.223 In determining whether a

218

See supra note 196and accompanying text (discussing the ultimate test applied by the Supreme in the
“transportation cases”). See also Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 250 (refuting the argument asserting the
necessity of consistent Internet regulation as a grounds for invalidating state Internet regulations under the
dormant commerce clause).
219
See id. (“[T]he Court has tended to invalidate a state’s regulation of railways and highways when the
regulation is widely out of step with most other states’ regulation of the subject matter, thus greatly raising
the cost of compliance whit the regulation.”)
220
See infra notes 238–240 and accompanying text (explaining how the interactivity of a Web site affects
the potential burden of complying with different state regulations).
221
See infra notes 222–231 and accompanying text (explaining reasoning of courts faced with “luring”
Internet statutes for holding that such statutes do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause).
222
See infra notes 223–227 and accompanying text (explaining courts’ reasoning that defendants having
acted within the jurisdiction through Internet communications with residents).
223
See People v. Hayne, No. F036401, 2002 WL 470853, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2002) (finding that
the California “seducing” statute at issue “in the context of the [California] Penal Code as a whole, only
penalizes acts that occur within the state”); Hatch v. Super. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 472 (Cal. Ct. App.
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state has criminal jurisdiction over a defendant who communicated electronically with a
state resident while physically located outside of the prosecuting state, several courts
recently have held that the criminal conduct is not complete until “the offending words
are heard by another person” or received electronically inside the state of prosecution.224
Thus, the defendant acts, at least partially, in the prosecuting state when he or she
intentionally transmits electronic communications to a minor located into the prosecuting
state.225 Additionally, in many of these cases, the adult, in order to achieve his or her
ultimate objective, needs to obtain information about the minor’s geographic location and
often travels to the prosecuting state in order to meet the minor face-to-face.226

2000) (stating that “the assumption that extraterritorial enforcement of state criminal statutes is normative
is incorrect” and that in order to be subject to California’s criminal jurisdiction a person must have
committed part of the crime within California); State v. Cunningham, 2004-Ohio-1935, ¶ 51, 808 N.E.2d
488, 494 (Ohio Ct. App.) (“Ohio has jurisdiction to prosecute crimes that are partially committed in the
state also where the object of the crime is located in Ohio.”).
224
People v. Ruppenthal, 771 N.E.2d 1002, 1008 (Ill. Ct. App. 2002). See also State v. Backlund, 2003 ND
184, ¶¶ 9-10, 672 N.W.2d 431, 435-36 (quoting Ruppenthal and holding that “a person who, while outside
of this state, solicits criminal action within this state and is thereafter found in this state” is subject to
criminal jurisdiction); Commonwealth v. John, 2004 WL 1557622, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 12, 2004)
(holding that a defendant who sent e-mail communications from Maryland and Delaware to a Pennsylvania
police officer posing as a thirteen year-old girl made solicitations in Pennsylvania “where they were
received”).
Courts have treated telephone communications in a similar manner. See United States v. Pezzino,
535 F.2d 483, 484 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that federal statute prohibiting the “transmission” of bets or
wagers on sporting events over interstate communication facilities included both the “use of interstate
facilities for sending or receiving wagering information.”); United States v. Synodinos, 218 F. Supp. 479,
481 (D. Utah 1963) (holding that Utah was a proper venue for a prosecution for “transmission” of bets or
wagers on sporting events over interstate facilities because “the District of Utah [was] where the use of the
interstate wire facilities had its ultimate impact, i.e., it was here that the messages . . . were actually
received”); State v. Meyers, 825 P.2d 1062, 1064-65 (Haw. 1992) (upholding conviction in Hawaii for
terrorist-like-threats made by defendant located in California through a telephone call to a probation officer
in Hawaii).
225
See Cunningham, 2004-Ohio-1935, ¶ 57, 808 N.E.2d at 495 (finding Ohio’s criminal jurisdiction
appropriate because, among other things, the defendant’s “intended victim was located in Ohio” and “the
recipient of the Defendant’s Internet communications was located in Ohio, and the Defendant was given
notice of this during the communications.”); John, 2004 WL 1557622, at *4 (“Certainly, a person who
receives a criminal solicitation while sitting at her computer terminal in Pennsylvania is being solicited
within this Commonwealth.”)
226
See supra note 207 (providing examples of cases where the defendant attempted to meet the intended
victim in person).
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Therefore, courts have held that these “luring” statutes prosecute activity that occurs
within that jurisdiction and do not operate extraterritorially.227
Second, courts have found that the burden placed on interstate commerce by such
statutes is very slight. This is largely because these statutes do not regulate legitimate
commerce.228 Moreover, the intent requirements of these statutes greatly reduce the
number of electronic communications affected by the regulations.229 In order to be
criminally liable, a defendant must intentionally send material to a known minor with the
intent to seduce or lure the minor into engaging in sexual activity.230 Thus, courts have

227

People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“When [the California statute at issue] is
harmonized with the entire California penal scheme, it does not effectively regulate activities beyond
California.”); Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 (“[T]here is no reason to suppose California would attempt to
impose its policies on other states in light of the relevant California penal statutes covering jurisdiction over
public offenses which generally bar punishment for wholly extraterritorial offenses”); Cunningham, 2004Ohio-1935, ¶ 57, 808 N.E.2d at 495 (holding that the defendant’s “over-extension and over-breadth
arguments do not apply to this case”).
228
E.g., Cashatt v. State, 873 So. 2d 430, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“[N]o legitimate commerce is
burdened by penalizing the transmission of harmful sexual material to known minors in order to seduce
them.”); People v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 127 (N.Y. 2000) (“We are hard pressed to ascertain any
legitimate commerce that is derived from the intentional transmission of sexually graphic images to minors
for the purpose of luring them into sexual activity. Indeed, the conduct sought to be sanctioned by [the
New York statute at issue] is of the sort that deserves no ‘economic’ protection.”); Backlund, 2003 ND 184,
¶ 17, 672 N.W.2d at 438 (“[I]t is difficult to ascertain any legitimate commerce that is derived from the
willful transmission of explicit or implicit sexual communications to a person believed to be a minor in
order to willfully lure that person in to sexual activity.”).
One commentator has gone a step further and asserted that “luring a minor over the Internet” does
not involve commerce at all, “and, as such, should not be subject to the dormant Commerce Clause
blocking power.” Stanger, supra note 206, at 220. But see Pann, supra note 202, at ¶ 29 (stating that “the
state courts have overstated their position when contending that no legitimate commerce is burdened, as
states may have different policies on what conduct is prohibited”).
229
People v. Hayne, No. F036401, 2002 WL 470853, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2002) (“[T]he intent to
seduce requirement greatly narrows the scope of the law and its effect on interstate commerce.”); Hatch v.
Super. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 472 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“While a ban on simple communication of
certain materials may interfere with an adult’s legitimate rights, a ban on communication of specified
matter to a minor for the purposes of seduction can only affect the rights of a very narrow class of adults
who intend to engage in sex with minors.”); Cashatt, 873 So. 2d at 436 (“[T]he statute does not burden
Internet users with inconsistent regulations because of the ‘intent to seduce’ element, which makes it much
narrower that the statute invalidated by American Libraries Association.”); People v. Foley, 692 N.Y.S.2d
248, 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (noting that “[t]he inclusion of the second [‘luring’] prong [of the New
York statute at issue] narrows its scope and lessens any burden on commerce”), aff’d, 731 N.E.2d 123
(N.Y. 2000); Stanger, supra note 206, at 227 (“[L]uring statutes are unlikely to have any type of ‘chilling
effect’ on Internet commerce because they proscribe only a narrow range of Internet activity.”)
230
Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191 (“Only when material is disseminated to a known minor with the intent to
arouse the prurient interest of the sender and/or minor and with the intent to seduce the minor does the
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held that states’ compelling interest in protecting minors from harm outweighs the
burden, if any, that these statutes place on interstate commerce.231
B. Reconciling the Cases Dealing with State Regulation of the Internet
According to the Degree of Anonymity and Interactivity of the Particular
Internet Communication Affected by the Regulation at Issue
The two main categories of cases examining state regulation of the
Internet under the dormant commerce clause illustrate how the degree of anonymity
between Web site users and operators affects the burden of complying with different state
regulations. The anonymity of Internet communications is one of the major
characteristics of the operation of the Internet that can make compliance with different
state regulations especially difficult.232 Often times, Internet users are unable to
dissemination become a criminal act.”); State v. Bolden, 2004-Ohio-2315, ¶47, 2004 WL 1043317 at *7
(Ohio Ct. App.) (explaining that the Ohio statute at issue “does not regulate the mere transmission of
pictures, images, or messages that are deemed harmful to children” instead the statute “regulates the
conduct of adults who seek to solicit minors to engage in sexual activity in conversations by means of the
Internet.”)
231
Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 (“[N]o rational analysis supports the proposition that [the California
statute at issue] imposes any burden on interstate commerce.”); Cashatt, 873 So. 2d at 436 (“The effect of
[the Florida statute at issue] on interstate commerce is incidental at best and is far outweighed by the state’s
interest in preventing harm to minors.”); Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 127 (holding that the New York “luring”
statute at issue was “a valid exercise of the State’s general police powers”); Bolden, 2004-Ohio-2315, ¶47,
2004 WL 1043317 at *7 (holding that Ohio “soliciting” statute “[did] not unduly interfere with interstate
commerce”).
A recent case used reasoning similar to the two arguments set out in the text above to hold
constitutional under the Commerce Clause a California statute prohibiting the use of “an electronic
communication device” to “willfully threaten [] to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily
injury to another person.” People v. Vijay, No. H024123, 2003 WL 23030492, at **6, 9-10 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 19, 2003) (alteration original). The defendant had threatened the husband of an ex-girlfriend with
bodily harm in an e-mail. Vijay, 2003 WL 23030492, at **4-5. The court found that: “California
prosecutes only those criminal acts that occur wholly or partially within the state. . . . Thus, [the criminal
threat statute at issue] cannot be enforced beyond that which is jurisdictionally allowed.” Id. at *10.
Furthermore, the court found that the intent requirement of the statute greatly narrowed the effect of the
statute on Internet activity: “To violate [the statute] the offender must willfully threaten to commit a crime
that would result in death or great bodily injury, and he must make the threat with the specific intent that
the statement be taken as a threat.” Id. The court stated that it could not “envision any legitimate
commerce involving the sending of messages that threaten death or great bodily injury to the recipient such
that that person is put in sustained fear for his or her own safety.” Id. n.7.
232
Transience is another significant characteristic of Internet communications that potentially makes
compliance with different state regulations problematic. Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 242. Transience
refers to “the almost infinite number of paths, through numerous states, that data can travel when two
computers on the Internet communicate with one another.” Id. Transience results from the distributed
network and packet-switching technology used to transport computer data across the Internet. Id. at 203-
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determine the physical location of the computers that facilitate Internet communications
because the Domain Name System (“DNS”)233 and Universal Resource Locator
(“URL”)234 used to tell computers where to retrieve or transport data do not necessarily
correspond to any specific geographic location.235 Instead, the DNS and URL provide a
hierarchical structure for computers to translate textual names into computer addresses.236
Consequently, Web site operators are often unaware of the physical location of users of
the site.237
However, the degree of interactivity of the Internet communications involved
determines how much anonymity ultimately will remain between users. For example,
operators of “passive” Web sites that simply “publish information which others can view
04. See also id. at 195-97 (providing a more in-depth explanation of the distributed network and packetswitching technology used in Internet communications).
However, two factors decrease the potential burden of transience. First, a state has very little
incentive to regulate activity when transient data travels through computers located in that state en route to
an end recipient in another state because such activity “does not cause any practical effect in the first state.”
Id. at 247. “A state only has an incentive to regulate Internet communications that either originate or are
received physically within the geographic boundaries of that state because those are the situations when the
activity can cause harmful effects in that state.” Id. at 247-48. Second, criminal jurisdiction limits the
ability of a state to enforce its regulations on the Internet. Id. at 248. Criminal jurisdiction requires that a
defendant commit at least part of an offense within the prosecuting state. Id. Moreover, in order to
prosecute an individual, a state normally “would have to extradite a person located in another state.” Id.
“[E]xtradition from one state to another is limited to individuals who have fled the state that seeks
extradition.” Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110
Yale L.J. 785, 815 (2001). “Thus, it seems very unlikely that ‘[a] Web site operator who has never had a
presence in the regulating state’ would face prosecution there.” Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 248
(quoting Goldsmith & Sykes, supra, at 815). See also id. at 247-49 (providing a more in-depth explanation
of how the lack of a state incentive to regulate Internet activity involving transient computer data and
criminal jurisdiction decrease the potential extraterritorial effect of state Internet regulations).
233
Douglas E. Comer, Internetworking with TCP/IP: Principles, Protocols, and Architectures 465 (4th ed.
2000) (describing the “mechanism that implements a machine name hierarchy” for Internet computers to
communicate with each other “is called the Domain Name System (DNS)”).
234
Christos J.P. Moschovitis et al., History of the Internet 164 (1999) (stating that Universal Resource
Locators are known as “URLs”).
235
Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 204. “Some authorities refer to the URL as the Uniform Resource
Locator as opposed to the Universal Resource Locator.” Id. at 202 n.71. See also Shea v. Reno, 930 F.
Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Joe Habraken, Absolute Beginner’s Guide to Networking 236 (3d ed.
2001); Comer, supra note 233, at 528.
236
Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 204. For a more in-depth explanation of how computers transport
computer data over the Internet and the World Wide Web, see id. at 198-203.
237
Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 205 (“By itself, the transporting of computer data across the Web from a
server to a computer using Web-browser software does not provide the site operator with any information
about the location of the person using the Web browser.”).
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on the site” and do nothing else will have little opportunity to learn of the physical
location of users of the site.238 On the other hand, operators of more “interactive” Web
sites that allow, or in some instances require, users to exchange information with the
operator’s computer server have more ability to discover the user’s physical location.239
Presumably, “[t]he more interactions that occur between the user and the Web site, the
more opportunities the host or operator of the site has to obtain information from the user
about the user’s physical location.”240 Similarly, people using electronic mail or
communicating in a chat room will have the opportunity to communicate their physical
location to one another. Once an Internet user discovers another party’s physical
location, the user can then either continue the communication concerned or cut it off if
the user knows that the jurisdiction in which the other party is located prohibits the
activity. Without knowledge of the physical location of the other party, though, users
have to comply with the most stringent state regulation that exists whether individuals
located in that state are involved in the communication or not. Therefore, the level of
interactivity of the Internet communications concerned affect how burdensome
compliance with different state Internet regulations can be.

238

See id. See also Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(describing a “passive Web site” as a site “that does little more than make information available to those
who are interested in it”).
239
Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 205-06.
Additionally, when a Web site sells tangible goods, the operator will likely need to know the
physical location of the site user in order to ship those goods to the user. Id. at 206. While this assumes
that the shipping address corresponds to the physical location of the user, “the buyer [in most instances will
have] every incentive to provide the host with accurate shipping information in order to receive the goods
purchased.” Id. However, this factor is less relevant to the current analysis because this article involves the
provision of a service, specifically the giving of legal advice, over the Internet and not a tangible good.
240
Id.
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Consequently, the interactivity of the Internet communications governed by a
particular state regulation is a key factor in reconciling the cases that have analyzed state
regulation of Internet activity under the dormant commerce clause.241 The state Internet
regulations that courts have invalidated under the dormant commerce clause potentially
affected passive Internet activity.242 These statutes prohibited Web site operators from
posting material on the Internet that would be “harmful to minors” and would have
covered passive Web sites where operators or hosts just made information available to
site users and had no additional contact with site users.243
On the other hand, the state Internet regulations that courts have held past muster
under the dormant Commerce Clause regulated more interactive Internet activity.244
These statutes largely have prohibited the use of the Internet by adults to lure known
minors into engaging in sexual activity with the adult.245 The activity affected by these
statutes often involved the adult engaging in multiple communications over the Internet
with the person believed to be a minor.246 In order to violate the statute, the adult had to
discover from the other party that they were a minor.247 Moreover, due to the interactive
nature of the activity involved, the potential defendant had the opportunity to discover the
physical location of the target and also had an incentive to discover the physical location
of the target in order to facilitate a face to face meeting.248 Thus, the dormant commerce
clause case law to date has tended to invalidate state Internet regulations that affected
241

Id. at 251-52, 254-55 (reconciling the Hatch and American Libraries Ass’n cases according to the
interactivity of the Internet conduct affected by the statutes at issue in each case).
242
Id. at 254 (analyzing the statute at issue in the American Libraries Ass’n case).
243
Id. (analyzing the statute at issue in the American Libraries Ass’n case); supra notes – and
accompanying text..
244
See id. (analyzing the statute at issue in the Hatch case).
245
See supra notes 205 and accompanying text.
246
See supra note 206and accompanying text.
247
Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 251.
248
See id. at 252; supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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passive Internet activity and to uphold regulations that dealt with more interactive
Internet communications.

VII.

DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT ABA
CHOICE OF ETHICS LAW RULE, MODEL RULE 8.5(b)(2), WHEN
APPLIED TO E-LAWYERING

Despite different descriptions in some of the case law, the dormant Commerce
Clause test boils down to whether the burden placed on interstate commerce by the state
regulation concerned outweighs the benefit to the state interest that the regulation
promotes, unless the state regulation at issue discriminates against out-of-state actors on
its face or a court can discern this was the purpose of the regulation.249 The current
version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) would apply a state’s ethics law to all attorney conduct,
by attorneys with offices located inside as well as outside of the state, that “occurred” or
had its “predominant effect” within a state.250 Therefore, because this rule treats both
resident and non-resident attorneys in the same manner, it is appropriate to apply the
dormant commerce clause balancing test from Pike v. Bruce Church to examine the
constitutionality of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) in the context of attorney representations of
clients over the Internet.251
The following hypothetical is included in order to provide a concrete example of a
potential Internet representation of a client and to facilitate a more clear understanding of
the interests, or lack thereof, of the various states that potentially could regulate and apply
249

See supra notes 192–196 and accompanying text (explaining the basic dormant commerce clause test
from Pike v. Bruce Church).
250
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002).
251
Cf. On Pet. for Review of Op. 475 of Advisory Comm. Prof’l Ethic & DR 2-102(c), 444 A.2d 1092, 1100
(N.J. 1982) (holding that New Jersey restriction on use in firm names of names of attorneys not licensed to
practice in New Jersey did not discriminate against interstate commerce because the restriction applied to
both residents and non-residents who were not licensed to practice in New Jersey and applying the Pike v.
Bruce Church balancing test to examine whether the regulation violated the dormant commerce clause).
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their laws to an attorney’s electronic representation of a client. An attorney with an
office located in Cincinnati, Ohio has a practice that, among other areas, focuses on
landlord-tenant and fair housing law. The attorney is licensed to practice only in Ohio.
In order to attract new clients, the attorney from time to time participates in Internet
bulletin boards where people with questions about landlord-tenant and fair housing law
post questions.
A mother with three young children residing in Roanoke, Virginia recently was
turned down after applying for a two bedroom apartment in a local apartment complex.
The reason given by the manager of the apartment complex was that the mother would
have exceeded the three person occupancy limit for that apartment. The manager of the
apartment complex explained that it has a policy of allowing only one more occupant
than the number of bedrooms in each apartment.252 The mother posts a question setting
out her situation on an Internet bulletin board dealing with landlord tenant law, asking
whether the complex’s occupancy policy violates any laws, and asking whether there are
any government offices that can help her.
The Ohio attorney posts a reply to the mother’s initial post on the landlord-tenant
Internet bulletin board and explains the process of lodging a complaint with the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) as well as how
complaints are lodged with most state agencies that deal with fair housing matters. He
also explain the process that HUD generally uses in processing such complaints. He
further states that it is possible that the apartment complex’s occupancy policy violates
federal fair housing laws due to a disparate impact on families. However, he explains

252

Thus, a maximum of two occupants are allowed in one bedroom apartments, and three occupants are
allowed in two bedroom apartments.
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that he would need more information from the mother and would have to do some legal
research in order to form a more definitive opinion. The attorney includes the Web
address of his firm Web site in his reply post in case the mother would like to discuss this
matter further with him.
The mother goes ahead and submits a housing discrimination complaint to HUD,
but also decides to contact the attorney about potentially filing a lawsuit against the
apartment complex. The mother goes to the attorney’s Web site. The attorney’s Web
site describes his practice and qualifications. The home page of the Web site also
contains a link entitled, “What are my rights?”253 When a visitor to the Web site clicks
on that link, he or she is then taken to another Web page entitled, “Wondering about a
legal problem that you have?” This page presents a client intake form to the visitor that
asks for the visitor’s name, contact information (including e-mail address), a brief
statement of the facts involved in the visitor’s legal problem, a listing of other parties or
actors involved with the visitor’s legal problem, and any questions that the visitor has for
the attorney about his or her legal problem. The mother fills out the client intake form
and clicks on the “Submit” button at the end of the intake form which sends her
information to the attorney’s computer in Ohio.
After receiving the potential client’s information through his Web site, the
attorney runs a conflicts check, and then sends an e-mail to the mother, stating the terms
of the representation, again stating his belief that the occupancy policy of the apartment
complex probably violates fair housing laws and including an information packet for the
client to fill out. Upon receipt of the attorney’s e-mail, the mother located in Virginia

253

Several characteristics of this Web site are based on a hypothetical presented in a California ethics
opinion. Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 2005-168 (2005).
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fills out the information packet provided to her and then sends the packet back to the
Ohio attorney as an attachment to an e-mail. The attorney follows up on the information
provided in the information packet by sending e-mail messages to the client, engaging in
some legal research and eventually communicating the client’s position to HUD through
a letter and several telephone calls before HUD reaches a resolution with the apartment
complex.
A. The Burden on E-Lawyering of Complying with Different State Ethical
Regimes
Electronic representations of clients involve interactive Internet communications
that would decrease anonymity among the parties involved and decrease the burden of
complying with differing state ethical rules with regard to such conduct. As explained
above, the anonymous nature of communications over the Internet is one of the major
factors that burden Internet actors in complying with differing state regulations.254
However, when Internet communications are more interactive, the ability to decrease
anonymity among actors exists.255 Electronic representations of clients involve
interactive communications between the attorney and client that allow the attorney to
discover the client’s physical location and then comport his or her conduct to the ethical
rules of that jurisdiction. This is especially true when e-mail communications are
involved as well as communications on Internet bulletin boards. Some Internet bulletin
boards even require that a user seeking legal advice indicate the jurisdiction in which they
are located.256 Furthermore, an attorney providing a form on a Web site to facilitate
client communication can adapt the form to require the client to indicate the jurisdiction

254

See supra notes 232–237 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 238–248 and accompanying text.
256
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
255
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where he or she physically is located. For example, in the hypothetical presented above,
the attorney first had an opportunity to learn of the jurisdiction in which the mother lived,
if he did not get this information from her initial post, when he posted a reply on the
Internet bulletin board. The attorney had a second opportunity to discover where the
mother resided through the client intake form included on his firm Web site.
While the example above did not involve contact between the attorney and client
in a real-time Internet chat room, even in this context an attorney would have an
opportunity to ask about the physical location of an individual who has asked a legal
question. Admittedly, an attorney in a real-time situation would have less time to discern
the ethical requirements of the applicable jurisdiction in order to comply with them.
However, an attorney that engages in chat room discussions on a regular basis could
familiarize him or herself in advance with the jurisdictions that prohibit certain activity
and cut off communications with individuals from those jurisdictions. Moreover, an
attorney involved in an electronic representation of a client in any context will need to
know the client’s physical location in order to provide competent legal advice. If the
attorney does not have this information, he or she should not be providing legal advice.
Consequently, anonymity is not a characteristic of electronic representations of clients,
and therefore, one of the largest factors that create a burden on Internet actors complying
with the regulatory regime of different states is not an issue in this context.
Nevertheless, in electronic representations of clients, there is some burden placed
on the attorney when the attorney has to ascertain and then comport his or activity with
the ethical regulations of different jurisdictions, especially if some jurisdictions prohibit
the attorney’s activity. For example, in the hypothetical above, the attorney located in
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Ohio would have to familiarize himself with both Ohio and Virginia’s legal ethics rules,
ascertain whether or not either state prohibits electronic representations, and if not,
whether either state imposes any special duties on attorneys that engage in such
representations. The attorney would also have to determine if Virginia’s ethics rules
conflict with Ohio’s rules in any relevant aspect, and if so, then determine which state’s
ethics laws should apply to his conduct.
However, the burden faced by attorneys in such situations are much less
significant than the heavy burdens faced, and noted by much of the case law dealing with
state Internet regulation, by individuals operating passive web sites. The interactivity of
the Internet communications involved in e-lawyering prevents the attorney from having
to comply with the regulations of the most restrictive states even when the representation
has no relationship with those states. For example, the Ohio attorney would only have to
consider the duties and restrictions imposed by Ohio and Virginia’s ethic rules, not the
ethics rules of every state. As long as Ohio and Virginia allowed this type of
representation, the attorney could engage in this electronic representation despite other
jurisdictions prohibiting electronic representation. In this manner, one jurisdiction would
not control the conduct of actors in electronic representations bearing no relationship at
all to that jurisdiction, and thus, any concerns about the extraterritorial application of
states’ ethics laws similar to those expressed in the line of cases invalidating state
regulation of the Internet under the dormant commerce clause are not relevant in this
context.
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B. The Benefits to Potential Jurisdictions of Applying Their Ethical Regimes to
E-Lawyering
Having analyzed the burden placed on attorneys in ascertaining which
jurisdictions ethic rules will apply when engaging in electronic representations, it is
necessary to examine the benefit to the potential states whose ethical regimes could apply
to any given representation. In an electronic representation involving an attorney and
client physically located in different jurisdictions, the ethics laws of both the client’s
home jurisdiction and the attorney’s home jurisdiction are potentially applicable to the
attorney’s conduct. The current version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) applies the ethics laws
“of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred” to an attorney unless “the
predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction.”257 A court would most
likely find that the lawyer’s conduct occurred or the predominant effect of the conduct in
an electronic representation was felt in either the client’s home jurisdiction, where the
attorney concerned presumably is not licensed, or the attorney’s home jurisdiction, where
the attorney presumably is licensed. In the hypothetical being used, the ethics rules of
Ohio, where the attorney’s office is located, and the ethics rules of Virginia, where the
client resides, are potentially applicable to the electronic representation concerned.
A dormant commerce clause analysis requires measuring the benefit to each of
these jurisdictions of applying its ethics law to electronic legal representations to
determine whether the benefit exceeds the burden placed on interstate commerce.
However, to determine the benefit to each jurisdiction, the actual interest of each
jurisdiction in regulating electronic representations first must be examined.

257

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002).
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1.

Interest of Jurisdiction Where Client Resides in Regulating Electronic
Representations

In an attorney’s electronic representation of a client, the jurisdiction where the
client is located, or the client’s home jurisdiction, has a legitimate consumer protection
interest in applying its ethics rules to this activity in most situations. Therefore, in the
hypothetical presented above, Virginia has a legitimate interest in regulating this situation
because the consequences of the representation ultimately was felt in Virginia. Virginia
was where the client acted upon the attorney’s legal advice provided and experienced the
end result of that advice.
The first ethical question in the electronic representation concerned would be
whether the Ohio attorney has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The purpose
of unauthorized practice regulations is consumer protection, more specifically to protect
state residents from representation in legal matters by people who have not satisfied the
various licensing requirements ensuring that a person will provide competent and ethical
legal representation to individuals.258 In other words, Virginia’s unauthorized practice

258

See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (“We recognize that the States have a
compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to
protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for
licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.”); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5
cmt. 2 (2002) (“[L]imiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of
legal services by unqualified persons.”); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 4, cmt. b
(2000) (“The primary justification given for unauthorized practice limitations was that of consumer
protection—to protect consumers of unauthorized practitioner services against the significant risk of harm
believed to be threatened by the nonlawyer practitioner’s incompetence or lack of ethical constraints.”);
Ritts, supra note 108, at 24 (“[W]hen foreign lawyers act in a state, outside of court, the state clearly has an
interest in regulating their conduct, in order to protect such residents of the state as might come into contact
with them.”). But see Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 4, cmt. c (2000) (stating that
“[s]everal jurisdictions recognize that many [out-of-court legal] services can be provided by nonlawyers
without significant risk of incompetent service” and “that actual experience in several states with extensive
nonlawyer provision of traditional legal services indicates no significant risk of harm to consumers of such
services”); Richard L. Abel, United States: The Contradictions of Professionalism, in 1 Lawyers in
Society: The Common Law World 186, 188 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 1988) (stating that
attorneys’ “substantive rules and the disciplinary process have been unresponsive to consumer grievances,
especially since neither does anything to ensure continuing technical competence among lawyers”); Rhode,
supra note 16, at 89 (“Three years in law school and passage of a bar exam are neither necessary nor
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laws provide some measure of protection to Virginia residents from incompetent legal
representation. Another ethical issue would be whether or not the attorney had violated
any rules governing attorneys’ solicitation of potential clients. Virginia’s legal
solicitation rules serve a similar consumer protect function of ensuring that attorneys do
not take advantage of Virginia residents through the manner in which they contact
potential clients or in the representations that they make to prospective clients.259
Whether a jurisdiction determines that an attorney can provide competent and
diligent representation to its residents, including whether the attorney can adequately
communicate with the client and implement procedures to avoid conflicts of interest, in
an electronic context would inform the unauthorized practice decision. For example, it is
appropriate for Virginia, where the mother resided, to weigh the benefits of allowing
attorneys located outside of, and presumably not licensed in, Virginia to provide legal
advice to Virginia residents through Internet bulletin boards or e-mail communications.
In the hypothetical presented above, the mother initially came into contact with the
attorney when the he posted a reply to the mother’s initial Internet bulletin board post
sufficient to ensure expertise in the areas where nonlawyer services flourish; lay specialists may be better
able to provide cost-effective services than lawyers who practice in multiple fields.”); Roger C. Cramton,
Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 531, 571 (1994) (“The current
law of unauthorized practice goes too far in seeking to protect consumers from competitive services
provided by nonlawyers. Consumer groups and ratings can guide consumers in choosing services.
Malpractice liability is likely to provide greater protection than professional controls applied to lawyers.”).
259
See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620-21, 624-25 (1995) (recognizing that states “have
a substantial interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and their loved
ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers” while examining Florida regulations that created “a
brief 30-day black-out period after an accident during which lawyers may not, directly or indirectly, single
out accident victims or their relatives in order to solicit their business,” ); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
R. 7.1 (2002) (prohibiting attorneys from making a “false or misleading communication about the lawyer or
the lawyer’s services”); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.1 cmt. 3 (2002) (noting that “an advertisement
that truthfully reports a lawyer’s achievements on behalf of clients or former clients may be misleading if
presented so as to lead a reasonable person to form an unjustified expectation that the same results could be
obtained for other clients in similar matters without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances
of each client’s case”); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.3 cmt. 5 (2002) (recognizing that even written
forms of solicitation, which are permitted under the Model Rules, “can be abused” and cannot be “false of
misleading” or involve “coercion, duress or harassment” as defined under Model Rules 7.1 and 7.3(b)(2)).
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about the apartment complex turning down her application due to the size of her family.
The mother learned some beneficial information through the attorney’s reply post. She
learned about the process for initiating a complaint with HUD, and she received a
preliminary opinion about whether she had a discrimination claim against the apartment
complex. This is information that she would not have had absent the communication
from the attorney. However, there are some significant ethical issues concerning the
manner in which the mother received this information. The attorney provided a legal
opinion on whether the mother had a valid discrimination claim against the apartment
complex based on very minimal information from her, with very little opportunity for
follow up questions, and without being able to make a complete conflicts check.
States have applied their unauthorized practice laws and solicitation rules to
analogous situations, often with little to no choice of law analysis, where attorneys
located and licensed in other jurisdictions attempted through normal United States mail
communications to procure residents of the regulating state as clients. In a series of
recent, related cases, the Indiana Supreme Court applied Indiana’s unauthorized practice
of law and solicitation rules to attorneys who had sent by United States mail written
solicitations to survivors of and relatives of people killed in a military plane crash in
Evansville, Indiana.260 These cases did not analyze explicitly the propriety of applying
Indiana ethics law to the conduct of attorneys licensed to practice in outside jurisdictions,

260

In re Coale, 775 N.E.2d 1079, 1080-81, 1083-84 (Ind. 2002) (“By their own admission, the respondents
sent videotapes, personal letters and folders containing information about their law firm and a firm
brochure to seven people who were widows, widowers or surviving parents of the crash victims or to the
crash victims themselves.”); In re Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d 719, 720, 721-22 (Ind. 2001) (noting that the
attorneys “caused to be delivered by United States mail written solicitations to prospective clients in
connection with the crash”). See also Sterns v. Lundberg, 922 F. Supp. 164, 166 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (stating
that the attorneys “although not admitted to practice law in Indiana, directed mailings to survivors and the
families of deceased crash victims in order to solicit potential clients”).
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but instead discussed the appropriateness of Indiana asserting disciplinary jurisdiction
over such attorneys.261
The court, determined that it had disciplinary jurisdiction over the attorneys
because “any acts” the attorneys took in Indiana constituting the practice of law were
“subject to [the court’s] exclusive jurisdiction to regulate professional legal activity in
this state.”262 Moreover, the court emphasized that the attorneys had directed activity that
had affected Indiana residents:
By directing the solicitations to the prospective clients, the respondents
communicated to those persons that they were available to act in a representative
capacity for them in Indiana courts to address loss or injury associated with the
plane crash. As such, they held themselves out to the public as lawyers in this
state when [none of them were] admitted to practice here. Those acts constituted
professional legal activity in this state subject to our regulatory authority.263
The Indiana Supreme Court then went on to apply Indiana ethics law to the conduct of
the attorneys concerned without analyzing whether this was appropriate or not.264
261

See Coale, 775 N.E.2d at 1080-81 (holding that Indiana Supreme Court could properly exercise
disciplinary jurisdiction over one attorney licensed to practice in the District of Columbia and one attorney
licensed to practice in California who directed written solicitations by United States mail to airplane crash
victims); Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d at 720-21 (holding that Indiana Supreme Court could properly exercise
disciplinary jurisdiction over two attorneys licensed to practice in California who directed written
solicitations by United States mail to airplane crash victims). See also Sterns, 922 F. Supp. at 168, 169
(holding that federal court would abstain from interfering in Indiana disciplinary proceeding when, among
other things, state court had already ruled on propriety of assertion of disciplinary jurisdiction and
subjecting “out-of-state lawyers who solicit Indiana citizens to [Indiana’s] disciplinary rules [was] not
foreclosed by existing case law”).
262
Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d at 721. See also Coale, 775 N.E.2d at 1081 (quoting Murgatroyd).
263
741 N.E.2d at 721 (citation and footnotes omitted). See also Coale, 775 N.E.2d at 1081 (quoting and
applying analysis from Murgatroyd to other attorneys not licensed in Indiana that directed solicitations to
survivors and families of victims of Indiana airplane crash). A federal court also held that the Indiana
Disciplinary Commission had a reasonable argument for subjecting the attorneys to Indiana’s disciplinary
jurisdiction in deciding to abstain from interfering in one of the Indiana disciplinary actions. Sterns, 922 F.
Supp. at 169 (“[T]he Court is simply not convinced that the Commission has no chance of subjecting outof-state lawyers to Indiana’s disciplinary rules . . . [A]t worst, the Commission’s attempt to subject out-ofstate lawyers who solicit Indiana citizens to this state’s disciplinary rules is not foreclosed by existing
caselaw [sic] and might even constitute an important case of first impression.”). Although never explicitly
stated in any of the decisions, the attorneys apparently directed at least some of their solicitations to Indiana
residents.
264
The court explicitly applied Indiana law to Coale and Allen. Coale, 775 N.E.2d at 1083-84. Because
Murgatroyd and Sterns presented the court with a proposed agreed judgment entered into with the state
disciplinary commission, the court cited and discussed Indiana ethics law without directly applying it.
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Presumably, the court felt that the justification for applying Indiana ethics rules to the
attorneys in this situation was so apparent and inherent in its powers as to not require any
discussion beyond that provided in deciding whether disciplinary jurisdiction was
appropriate.265 The same policy justification exists for applying the ethics law of the
jurisdiction where the client resides whether the attorney communications concerned
occur through regular U.S. mail, by telephone or through the Internet. The jurisdiction
has an interest in protecting consumers of legal services that reside in that jurisdiction in
each of these contexts.
In the hypothetical situation discussed above, should Virginia decide to allow the
electronic representation, the next step involves determining if the attorney should use
any special precautions or procedures during the representation. It is appropriate for
Virginia, where the client resides, to determine how best to protect its residents in such
representations. Consumer protection considerations similar to those discussed above
would inform this decision. In other words, Virginia should decide what safeguards an
attorney should employ to deal with the advertising, solicitation, confidentiality and
conflicts issues,266 among other things, that arise in electronic representations of Virginia
residents because the client experiences the benefits of or harm from the representation in
Virginia.
Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d at 721-22 nn.3-8, 722. See also Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct,
Advisory Op. 94-02 (1994) (applying Illinois unauthorized practice of law statute to attorney licensed “only
in a state other than Illinois” who mailed “packets of material advertising his law firm’s personal injury
litigation services, with letters of solicitation, to persons who were injured in major disasters in Illinois”).
265
Such a view effectively would fold the choice of law analysis into the decision on disciplinary
jurisdiction. This might have arisen from the fact that at the time of these decisions Indiana had only
incorporated the original version of Model Rule 8.5, which did not contain a choice of law provision, into
its ethics rules. Ind. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 (West 2005) (Historical & Statutory Notes) (setting out
the language of the version of Rule 8.5 effective from Jan. 1, 1987 to Dec. 31, 2004). It also is possible
that the Indiana court simply did not think about the appropriateness of applying its law in this situation.
266
See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (setting out the ethical issues that various jurisdictions
have recognized electronic representations raise).
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2.

Lack of Interest of Attorney’s Home Jurisdiction in Applying Its Ethics
Law to an Electronic Representation that Affects a Resident of Another
State

The attorney’s home state does not have a corresponding consumer interest in
regulating the electronic representation concerned by applying its ethics law to the
representation. Ohio, although it is the attorney’s licensing state, has a negligible interest
in choosing the best manner of protecting a Virginia resident who the Ohio attorney
represents “electronically,” whether it be by not allowing such representations or to allow
such representations if certain safeguards are use. This is especially the case if Virginia,
where the client resides, has decided to protect its citizens in a different manner than
Ohio. This results because the consequences of the attorney’s actions are experienced by
a Virginia resident in Virginia. Virginia is where the mother acted upon the attorney’s
advice by filing a HUD claim, where the mother is seeking an apartment, and where the
mother will experience the benefits or harm that results from the manner in which her
legal problem is resolved. Therefore, Ohio has very little to no interest in determining by
applying Ohio law whether the attorney is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law
by providing legal advice to a person residing in Virginia through the Internet. Ohio also
has no interest in determining through its ethics law how Virginia residents are solicited.
Ohio might assert that it has an interest in regulating the conduct of attorneys it
licenses no matter where that conduct occurs or is felt in order to protect the purity of its
bar. 267 In the past, some courts have asserted that the licensing jurisdiction’s interest in
“purifying” the attorneys it licenses to practice law justifies the application of that

267

The rationale for such extraterritorial application of the licensing jurisdiction’s ethics rules is that the
licensing state has “an obligation to protect the ‘purity’ of the state’s bar, and that ‘purification’ [requires]
vigilance against questionable conduct of lawyers, no matter where it [occurs].” Ritts, supra note 108, at
27.
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jurisdiction’s ethics laws to the conduct of such attorneys that occurs outside of the
borders of the licensing jurisdiction.268 In many of these cases, the courts used this
“purification” interest to apply a jurisdiction’s legal ethics regime to extraterritorial
attorney conduct in situations “where other contacts or governmental interests [were]
entirely absent.”269
While this purification interest justifies Ohio disciplining an Ohio attorney for
conduct occurring in the electronic representation of a resident of Virginia, it does not
justify applying Ohio law to determine whether or not the attorney engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law in Virginia or violated any ethical duty owed to the Virginia
resident if Ohio’s ethics rules differ from Virginia’s rules in the context concerned.270
Ohio can protect its interest in ensuring that the attorneys it licenses to practice law

268

See Ritts, supra note 108, at 27, 33-40 (discussing cases asserting that purification of a jurisdiction’s
bar justified that application of its ethics rules to extraterritorial conduct of lawyers licensed by that
jurisdiction). See also, e.g., People ex rel. Colo. Bar Ass’n v. Lindsey, 283 P. 539, 546 (Colo. 1929) (“The
respondent’s oath of office as an attorney and counselor at law is not only binding here in Colorado but
everywhere. . . It abides with him at all times and places, and he will be held responsible to this court for
his misconduct as an attorney so long as his name continues on the roll; nor can he put himself in a position
which will place him beyond the inherent power of this court to purify the bar of its unworthy members,
and to keep its roster clean.”); Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So.2d 193, 196, 197 (Fla. 1965) (recognizing that
“to ignore acts of professional misconduct merely because they occurred outside this state would be to
ignore our duty to protect the people of this state from one who has been held by another state to be unfit”
and giving collateral estoppel effect to the factual findings of the other state’s judgment but determining
that “the discipline to be awarded for such acts by this state shall be determined by this court and its
agencies in the same manner as in all other disciplinary proceedings”); In re Veach, 287 S.W.2d 753, 759
(Mo. 1956) (“If one has been guilty of conduct inconsistent with the standard expected of lawyers as
officers of the court, it should make no difference whether the acts were committed on this side or the other
of a theoretical fence. There are no territorial boundaries in cases of such misconduct. The wrong and the
guilt is within the person himself, and he carries it with him; he cannot be mentally and professionally pure
in Missouri and impure in Illinois.”).
269
Ritts, supra note 108, at 55.
270
See Ritts, supra note 108, at 34-35 (“[I]n the interest of bar ‘purification,’ a court has subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear any case involving alleged professional misconduct of its attorneys; the bar purification
interest, however, is not so strong, standing alone, as to justify application of the foreign state’s rule where
they conflict with the forum’s rules which are more permissive.”).
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conduct themselves in an ethical manner by asserting disciplinary jurisdiction over the
attorneys and then applying Virginia’s ethics rules to the conduct in question.271
Moreover, any interest Ohio has in policing or purifying its bar that supports
applying Ohio’s ethics rules to the electronic representation concerned, assuming this
interest exists at all, should give way to the much greater interest of Virginia in protecting
its citizens from potentially incompetent legal representation, choosing the best manner in
which to balance its citizens’ access to legal services against the ethical issues posed by
electronic representations, and deciding how to best minimize the ethical concerns of
such representations. Therefore, in dormant commerce clause terms, the putative benefit
to the attorney’s home jurisdiction in applying its ethic laws to electronic representations
is negligible at best while the benefit to the client’s home jurisdiction is great.
C. The Safe Harbor Language of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) Invalidates the Choice of
Ethics Law Rule Under the Dormant Commerce Clause Because It Allows the
Ethics Laws of the Attorney’s Home Jurisdiction to Apply to All Electronic
Representations
The lack of interest of the attorney’s home jurisdiction in applying its ethics laws
to an electronic representation is problematic under the dormant commerce clause when
the language of the current version of Model Rule 8.5 is examined. Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)
initially applies the ethics “rules of the jurisdiction in which the attorney’s conduct
occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the
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See Ritts, supra note 108, at 40 (stating that “‘purification’ alone is not an adequate answer to choice-oflaw questions when they arise, since the purification goal was advanced equally well in both sets of cases
[where courts asserted disciplinary jurisdiction over attorneys licensed in that state for extraterritorial
conduct], regardless of whether forum or foreign law was applied”). See also, e.g., In re Harris-Smith, 871
A.2d 1183, 1184-85 (D.C. 2005) (applying identical reciprocal discipline to attorney disbarred in another
jurisdiction for misconduct occurring in the other jurisdiction); In re Barneys, 861 A.2d 1270, 1274-75
(D.C. 2004) (same). Furthermore, if ethics rules are recognized as “only an imperfect representation of the
‘moral purity’ required for the responsible practice of law, then a state’s concern for attorneys’ ‘moral
purity’ cannot alone justify application of its ethics rules in an extraterritorial manner, at least not where the
other jurisdiction has meaningful standards of professional conduct to apply.” Ritts, supra note 108, at 55.
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rules of that jurisdiction.”272 It is very unclear where an attorney’s conduct “occurs” in
an electronic representation of a client. Assuming the attorney and client are located in
different states, the attorney’s conduct effectively occurs in two jurisdictions: in the
attorney’s home jurisdiction where the attorney initiates the Internet communication and
in the jurisdiction where the client is located and receives the communication. Therefore,
equally persuasive arguments can be presented for the attorney’s conduct having
“occurred” in the attorney’s home jurisdiction as well as in the client’s home jurisdiction
depending on the point of view used. Consequently, comparing the interests of the
jurisdictions concerned according to “where the lawyer’s conduct occurred,” as stated in
the first part of the test set out in Model Rule 8.5(b)(2), is unhelpful because it is
impossible to locate a single, discrete jurisdiction where the activity concerned actually
took place.
However, examining where the “predominant effect” of an electronic
representation occurs, as used in the second part of the test used in Model Rule 8.5(b)(2),
yields a more meaningful comparison of the interests of the potential jurisdictions under a
dormant commerce clause analysis. In an attorney’s electronic representation of a client,
the jurisdiction where the client is located, or the client’s home jurisdiction, has a
legitimate consumer protection interest in applying its ethics rules to this activity. For
example in the hypothetical electronic representation set out above, Virginia has a
legitimate interest in regulating the representation because the consequences of the
representation ultimately were felt in Virginia, where the Virginia resident acted upon the
attorney’s advice.

272

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002).
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This is why the safe harbor language of the current version of Model Rule
8.5(b)(2) is problematic under the dormant commerce clause. This language would not
subject an attorney to discipline if his or her conduct conformed “to the rules of a
jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the
lawyer’s conduct” occurred.273 As explained above, the limited authority available on
where the “predominant effect” of an attorney’s conduct occurs gives an attorney in
almost all situations reasonable grounds to argue that the ethics law of his or her home
jurisdiction apply to electronic representations. Some of this authority appears to
consider where the attorney physically drafted documents and conducted research for the
representation concerned,274 and in almost any electronic representation, this conduct will
occur in the attorney’s home jurisdiction.
Certainly, in the hypothetical situation being used, the Ohio attorney would have
conducted in his Ohio office any research regarding whether the apartment complex
discriminated against the mother under applicable fair housing laws. Similarly, the Ohio
attorney would have drafted in his Ohio office any documents needed in the
representation. The case and administrative authority would add to practical arguments
that the attorney would have that he reasonably believed that Ohio ethics law governed
the electronic representation of the Virginia resident because Ohio is his licensing
jurisdiction and the physical location in which he conducted the legal work involved in
the representation. Thus, the safe harbor to Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) results in the ethics law
of the attorney’s home jurisdiction almost always to apply to electronic representations of
clients.

273
274

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002).
See supra notes 166, 169–170, 181 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, as established above, the attorney’s home jurisdiction has little to
no interest in applying its ethics laws to electronic representations and thus derives no
benefit from regulating this activity in this manner. Therefore, a choice of law rule that
results in always applying the ethics law of the attorney’s home jurisdiction to an
attorney’s conduct in electronic representations fails to meet the minimum threshold
required under the dormant commerce clause.275 This is because the benefit to this state
of applying its ethics laws to such representations does not outweigh the burden placed
on such representations by applying the ethics law of the attorney’s home jurisdiction.
In fact, always applying the ethics regime of the attorney’s home jurisdiction in
the context of electronic attorney representations ignores the legitimate interest of the
client’s jurisdiction, where the consequences of the representation usually are
experienced, in deciding how to best protect its residents. Thus, in the hypothetical
situation, the safe harbor language would allow Ohio law to control the type of legal
representation that a Virginia resident can use in order to get legal advice regarding an
incident that occurred in Virginia and in order to take action in Virginia. This constitutes
an impermissible burden on this activity. Consequently, due to the safe harbor language,
the current version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) violates the dormant commerce clause.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, states should consider adopting the 2002 version of Model Rule
8.5(b)(2) without the final sentence containing the safe harbor language. In this manner,
only the jurisdiction where the largest effect from each representation is experienced
275

See supra note 200 and accompanying text (stating that dormant commerce clause principles determine
whether the application of a particular state’s laws meets minimum Constitutional thresholds rather than
determining the one jurisdiction’s law that would be most appropriate to apply in a given situation).

Copyright © 2006 by Michael W. Loudenslager

78
would apply its ethics rules to electronic representations. In many situations, this is going
to be the jurisdiction where the client physically is located, especially when the client acts
upon the legal advice obtained through the electronic representation in the client’s home
jurisdiction. Presumably, the safe harbor language is intended to protect attorneys from
facing conflicting obligations under the ethics rules of multiple jurisdictions. However,
this language, in conjunction with the limited authority on where the “predominant
effect” of multijurisdictional representations occurs and practical arguments regarding
attorneys’ reasonable beliefs about where such effect occurs, results in the application of
the ethics laws of the attorney’s home jurisdiction to all electronic representations.
Because the attorney’s home jurisdiction obtains very little benefit from the application
of its laws in the vast majority of situations, this outcome violates the dormant commerce
clause. Three jurisdictions, Florida, Indiana and New Jersey, have already adopted the
2002 version of Model Rule 8.5 without the final safe harbor sentence.276
Alternatively, jurisdictions could adopt a choice of ethics rule that applies the
ethics laws of the client’s jurisdiction to all electronic representations involving residents
of that state. A few states have done this, in effect, for all multijurisdiction
representations involving attorneys not licensed by the state that occur within that state’s
boundaries.277 This potentially could provide more clarity concerning which
jurisdiction’s rules would apply to a particular electronic representation.
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Fla. Bar R. 3-4.6 (effective Jan. 1, 2006); Ind. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 (effective Jan. 1, 2005);
N.J. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 (effective Jan. 1, 2004).
277
Cal. Rules of Ct. R. 967 (effective Nov. 15, 2004) (allowing an attorney licensed and in “good standing”
in another United States jurisdiction to provide “legal advice in California to a client concerning a
transaction or other nonlitigation matter” as long as, among other things, the attorney agrees that the
provision of legal services is subject to California’s rules of professional conduct); Colo. R. Civ. P. 220
(effective Jan. 1, 2003) (allowing an attorney “licensed to practice law . . . in another jurisdiction in the
United States” and “in good standing of the bar of all courts and jurisdictions in which he or she is admitted
to practice” to “practice law in the state of Colorado . . . subject to the Colorado Rules of Professional
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However, as explained above, it is very difficult to determine exactly where an
electronic representation “occurs.” Thus, under the current language of the choice of
ethics law rules in these jurisdictions, it may still be difficult to determine exactly when
the ethics rules of a particular jurisdiction apply to an electronic legal representation,
even under such seemingly “bright line” rules. Furthermore, depending on the
circumstances of the particular representation, the representation may have a greater
relationship with the attorney’s home jurisdiction than the client’s jurisdiction, although a
court might be able to determine that components of the representation occurred in the
client’s jurisdiction. An example of this would be when a client has communicated with
an attorney over the Internet about a matter governed by the law of the attorney’s home
jurisdiction and which requires the attorney physically to take some legal action in the
attorney’s home jurisdiction, such as submitting documents to a court or office located in
that jurisdiction or engaging in a legal transaction with other parties located in the
attorney’s home jurisdiction. In these cases, the attorney’s home jurisdiction would have
a significant interest in proscribing the ethical limitations of the representation.
Conversely, adopting the 2002 version of Model Rule 8.5(b) without the safe
harbor language contained in the last sentence of subsection 2 would still allow some
flexibility in applying the ethic rules of the jurisdiction with the most significant
relationship to a particular electronic representation. However, this rule would avoid the
unconstitutional application of the legal ethics rules of the attorney’s home jurisdiction to

Conduct”); Nev. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 189.1 (effective Sept. 24, 2002) (requiring an attorney
“admitted and in good standing in another jurisdiction in the United States, and who provides legal services
for a Nevada client in connection with transactional of extra-judicial matters that are pending or
substantially related to Nevada” to file and annual report, along with a fee, to the State Bar of Nevada and
to “familiarize himself or herself and comply with the standards of professional conduct required of
members of the State Bar of Nevada”).
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electronic representations in which that jurisdiction has very little interest, which will be
the situation more often than not. Instead of applying the home jurisdiction’s ethics laws
when any remotely plausible connection can be drawn between that jurisdiction and the
representation at issue, which always will be possible in an electronic representation, this
choice of ethics law rule would allow a court to examine the particular circumstances of
each electronic representation and apply the ethics rules of the jurisdiction where the
most significant effect of the representation is felt.
A third option would be to retain the current safe harbor language but amend
Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) to include definitions for “conduct occurred” and “predominant
effect” that focus on the location of the client affected by the legal representation and the
jurisdiction where the legal advice provided in the representation is acted upon and has
effect. These definitions would eliminate any basis for an attorney to argue that the
“predominant effect” of a legal representation occurred in the jurisdiction where the
attorney simply drafted legal documents or conducted legal research. Therefore, by
either eliminating the safe harbor language currently contained in Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)
or by precisely defining the key terms “conduct occurred” and “predominant effect,” a
jurisdiction can align the choice of ethics law determination more closely to the actual
interests the potential jurisdictions have in and the benefits they receive from applying
their legal ethics regimes to electronic representations.
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